NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 72 | Number 4

Article 4

4-1-1994

Legal Classics: After Deconstructing the Legal
Canon
Francis J. Mootz III

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Francis J. Mootz III, Legal Classics: After Deconstructing the Legal Canon, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 977 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol72/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

LEGAL CLASSICS: AFTER DECONSTRUCTING THE
LEGAL CANON*
FR NCis J. MooTz

ml**

The debate over the canon has gripped the University in recent years. Defenders of the canon argue that canonical texts
embody timeless and universal themes, but critics argue that the
process of canonization subordinates certain people and viewpoints within society in order to assertthe existence of a univocal
tradition. Originatingprimarily in the field of literary criticism,
the canon debate recently has emerged in legal theory.
Professor FrancisJ. Mootz argues that the issues raised by
the canon debate are relevant to legal scholarship, teaching and
practice. After reviewing the extensive commentary on the literary canon, ProfessorMootz criticizes the polemical structure of
the debate and asserts that an appreciation of classical, as opposed to canonical,texts opens the way for a productive inquiry.
He defines a classical text as one that both shapes contemporary
concerns and also serves as a point of referencefor revising these
concerns. Classical texts enable criticalperspectives ratherthan
submitting to them, he continues, because they provide the arena
for debates about issues ofpublic concern. Using Hadley v. Baxendale as an example of a legal classic, ProfessorMootz contends
that the power of such a classicaltext is its ability to shape hotly
contested legal debates.
Our time... seems unpropitious for thinking about the question
of the classic, for ... it seems to be a simple either/or that requires merely a choosing of sides: for or against? back to the classics or away from them? Our time calls not for thinking but a
vote. And it may well be too late for thinking about the classic in
any case, for the vote is already in, and the nays have it.
This is a world that has no place for the classics, only for
texts, and all texts are created equal.
• Copyright © 1994, Francis J. Mootz
•* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A., University of Notre Dame; A.M. (Philosophy), Duke University; J.D., Duke University School of
Law. I would like to thank Jim Gardner, Don Korobkin, Caren Senter, and my colleagues who
attended a faculty forum at which I presented this Article, all of whom offered very helpful comments and criticisms; Michelle Dill LeRose for securing many of the cited materials through
interlibrary loan; Nancy Hachigian for her secretarial assistance; and Western New England College School of Law, Howard Kalodner, Dean, for financial support.
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If our time tends to celebrate plurality, diversity, and even
conflict, the contrary impulse toward unity and unanimity cannot
be long in reasserting itself. What philosophical hermeneutics reminds us, however, is that both extremes, homogeneity and heterogeneity alike, deaden mental activity. For understanding lives in
the play of equivalence and difference.
-Joel Weinsheimert
The idea of a common language and a common vocabulary
among legal academics, and indeed, a common canon of legal
materials, has increasingly become a fiction.
-Sanford Levinson and J. M. Balkin2
INTRODUCTION:

THE PAST

AS

PROLOGUE

The question of the canon has dominated talk within the University
during the past decade. The emergence of the canon debate in legal scholarship, then, should come as no surprise. In recent years, trends in legal
theory generally have followed the intellectual movements within English
departments and have lagged even further behind the developments emerging from philosophy departments. Although legal theorists sometimes resemble pathological neophiliacs-rushing to embrace the latest Paris
fashion without stopping to engage in careful, independent, and critical
thinking-it would be incorrect to conclude that the interdisciplinary character of contemporary legal scholarship is entirely detrimental. Admittedly,
legal theorists have, in the past, joined intractable debates that already had
worn out their contestants in other disciplines, arriving too late to garner
any intellectual energy.3 However, legal theorists have also brought new
life to ongoing debates by culling the careful thinking and research that
1. JOEL WNsHmmER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMEUICS AND LrERARY THEORY 124, 126,
xiii (1991).
2. Sanford Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Law, Music, and OtherPerformingArts, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 1597, 1653 (1991).
3. For example, it is questionable whether the sudden fixation on the jargon of postmodern
theory sheds much light on jurisprudential issues. See Francis J. Mootz mII, Postmodern Constitu.
tionalism As Materialism,91 MicH. L. REv. 515, 515-25 (1992). Political philosophers have been
attempting to move beyond the dead ends created by over-exuberant extensions of deconstructive
and postmodern approaches by returning to broader themes within the philosophical tradition.
See, e.g., RICHARD J. BsRNsTmN, TiE Nw CoNsTELLAmIoN: THE ETHICAL-PoLITICAL HoIuZONS
OF MODERNrrY/PoSTMODERNrrY passim (1991) (defending a pragmatic humanism grounded in
reflective action). Bernstein writes:

[I]t is becoming increasingly evident that the terms "modem" and "postmodem" are not
only vague, ambiguous and slippery, they have been used in conflicting and even contradictory ways.... My own conviction is that we have reached a stage of discussion

where these labels (and their cognates) obscure more than they clarify-that it is better
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precedes them in other disciplines and then advancing the debate within a
new context.4 It would be as senseless as it is impossible to try to insulate
legal theory from broader intellectual currents. Jurisprudence is not just an
analytical tool for assessing the legal system; it is a critical gesture lodged
within the concrete setting of legal practice that draws from and contributes
to developments of our various political, ethical, epistemological, and ontological traditions. The important question is whether the canon debate will
influence and be influenced by legal theory in a productive manner.
What is the canon debate that legal scholars inherit from the other side
of campus? It is a contentious and politically charged effort to define our
cultural tradition in the wake of decades of ideology critique. The debate
currently centers on the content of the literary curriculum. In its crudest
form, the debate amounts to a quarrel over whether students should continue to read the time-honored classics or whether they should read the
emerging and previously neglected voices of women, people of color, and
other oppressed members of society. Preemptive efforts by defenders of the
canon to preserve "high culture" from the perceived wave of political correctness sweeping across America's campuses have received public notoriety and substantial attention in the media.' In recent years, the Chronicleof
to drop these terms from our 'vocabularies,' and to try to sort out the relevant issues
without reifying these labels.
Id. at 200.
In a similar vein, the relatively recent fixation by many legal scholars on the concept of
republicanism, which was "revived" originally by historians of the revolutionary era, comes just at
the time that the concept is "now thinning out in the atmosphere ... as its ontological status grows
fainter and more confused." Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Careerof a Concept, J. Am.
HisT., June 1992, at 11, 37. Rogers describes how legal theorists, self-admitted "natural scavengers," swept up the increasingly vacuous concept of republicanism as a cure-all for liberalism's ills.
Id. at 33.
4. Feminist legal scholarship contributes both to feminist thinking generally and to legal
theory, although it is certainly true that feminist legal scholars can become entangled in the conundrums of feminist theory to the point that they are unable to advance the relevant legal issues.
Examples of feminist contributions within the context of legal scholarship are DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCrION, AND THE LAW (1991);
ZILLAH R. EIsENsTEIN, THm FEmALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988); and CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEaxAL HARAssmENT OF WORKNG WOMEN (1979). Eisenstein and Cornell both criticize

MacKinnon's later philosophical efforts as remaining trapped within the unhelpful "sameness/
difference" opposition that underwrites a substantial portion of feminist theory. CORNELL, supra,
at 119-41; EsasiN, supra, at 55-57.
5. See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); Dn,msH
D'SouzA, ILLiBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEx ON CAMPus (1991); ROGER
KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: How PoLITcs HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCATION (1990);
Roger Kimball, "Tenured Radicals": A Postscript, 9 NEw CRrrERION 4 (1991). Bloom's book
captured the popular imagination and received a great deal of press. It can be compared to the
cannon fire over Fort Sumter for purposes of the debate. News accounts consistently referred to
Bloom's book when reporting the battle over the core curriculum at Stanford University. See,
e.g., The Canons Under Fire,TnME, April 11, 1988, at 66, 66-67; Stanford's Core "Canon" Debate Ends in Compromise, CHmSTIAN SCIENCE MONrrOR, April 8, 1988, at 19, 19-20; George
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Higher Education has become a primary forum for the "heated and

far-reaching" debate within the teaching profession, 6 but the debate spills
over into the popular media as well.7 The discussion is often acrimonious,
reflecting the political significance that the contestants place on the issues
raised. One commentator concludes that the "controversy erupting over
[the question of the canon] has produced a great volume of polemical writing, so much in fact that one must say that the controversy is one of the

more important events in the history of twentieth-century [literary] criticism."' This political battle manifests deeper intellectual currents that have
swirled through the University for some time now, although popular fasci-

nation with the topic undoubtedly has stimulated continued scholarly
attention. 9
Will, Stanford's Regression, WASH. POST, May 1, 1988, at C7. Although Bloom is correctly

characterized as a "conservative" in the sense of one who strives to conserve cultural traditions, it
is a mistake to read Bloom as suggesting that there is a determinate core group of texts that must
be mastered.
One needn't set up a canon of books to read. In fact, I think such lists are rather silly.
The important thing is to find one book and follow where it leads. In that way a whole
world can be constructed that moves from philosophy to literature, art and music. If you
touch the heart with one book, it can transform a life.
Allan Bloom, A Book Can Transforma Life, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 1987, at 95, 95;
cf. E. D. HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LrrRACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNow passim

(1987) (identifying the core knowledge required for a person to be culturally literate).
6. Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education,79 CAL. L. Rav.
1511, 1513 n.3 (1991) (citing numerous articles in the Chronicle of Higher Education and other
sources).

7. See, e.g., Irving Howe, The Value of the Canon, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 40,
40-53; John Searle, The Storm Over the University, N.Y. Rsv. BooKs, Dec. 6, 1990, at 34, 34-42.
8. John Guillory, Canon, in CRITICAL TERms FOR LITERARY STUDY 233-34 (Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 1990); see also Peter Erickson, The Question of the Canon:
The Examples of Searle, Kimball and Kernan, 6 TEXTUAL PRAC. 439, 439 (1992):
For both sides, symbolic effects [in the conduct of the debate] are believed to have
political effects. [In contrast with political and economic changes], the prospect of
cultural change symbolized by a reconstituted curriculum implies a threat at once more
subtle and more difficult, if not impossible, to defend against.
9. The current canon debate came into its own with a symposium appearing in Critical
Inquiry in 1983. Canons, 10 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 1-223, 321-47, 462-542 (1983) (featuring essays by leading scholars such as Barbara Hermstein Smith, Jerome J. McGann, and Charles Altieri). These essays subsequently were published as a book. CANONS (Robert von Hallberg ed.,
1984); see also ENGLISH LITERATURE: OPENING UP THE CANON: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
ENGLISH INSTITUTE (Leslie A. Fiedler & Houston A. Baker, Jr. eds., 1981). In many respects, the
subsequent literature has been devoted to working through the many issues raised in this highly
regarded symposium. See, e.g., CHARLES ArTam, CANONS AND CONSEQUENCES: REFLECTIONS
ON THE ETHICAL FORCE OF IMAGINATIVE IDEALS (1990); MARILYN BUT.ER, LITERATURE AS A
HERITAGE, OR READING OTHER WAYS (1987); ANTONY EASTHOPE, LITERARY INTO CULTURAL
STUDIES (1991); FEMIISMS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF LITERARY THEORY AND CRITICISM 189-261
(Robyn R. Warhol & Diane Price Hemdl eds., 1991); HENRY L. GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS:
NOTES ON Tm CULTURE WARS (1992); GERALD GRAFF, BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS: How
TEACHING THE CONFLICTS CAN REvITALIZE AMERICAN EDUCATION (1992); FRANK KERMODE, PoETRY, NARRATrIVE, HISTORY (1990) [hereinafter KERMODE, POETRY]; FRANK KERMODE, HISTORY
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The canon debate translates to the idiom of legal scholarship quite easily. It is a foregone conclusion that some legal theorists will broaden the
debate to include issues arising within legal practice, education, and scholarship. In a sense, the legal canon has been under heavy fire for some time
now. On a general level, the canon debate is a concrete manifestation of the
deeper destabilization wrought by critical, deconstructive, and postmodern
approaches that already influence legal theory."0 The presupposition of a
legal canon is difficult to justify after decades of relentless demystifying
critiques by legal theorists. The traditional idea of a legal canon rests on the
assumption that there is a rule-governed process for identifying authoritative texts, determining their meaning, and evaluating their worth. This assumption, in turn, appears to be grounded in the belief that law is a
univocal, hierarchically ordered system. The canonical exemplar of this
traditional view is Dean Langdell's now infamous contracts casebook, in
which he purported "to select, classify and arrange" all the contracts cases
that "had contributed in any important degree to the growth, development,
or establishment" of the essential principles of contract doctrine." Langdell's approach presumes that the cases are the law, that the cases are to be
interpreted in a certain manner, and that, once interpreted, the cases may be
classified as good or bad, important or irrelevant.
It is almost too easy to debunk this traditional account of the legal
canon. The well-rehearsed (though diverse) critical moves by feminists,
AND VALUE (1988) [hereinafter KERMODE, HISTORY]; FRANK KERMODE, FoRs OF ATTENTION
(1985); ARNOLD KRUPAT, ETHNocR1Tcism: ETHNOGRAPHY, HISTORY, LrrTERAiE (1992); ARNoLD KRUPAT, TIE VOICE IN THE MARGIN:

NATIVE AMERIcAN LrTRATRE

Am

THE CANON

(1989); VASSILIS LAMBROPOULOS, THE RIsE OF EUROCENTRISM: ANATOMY OF INTERPRETATION
INTERTEXTUALrrY (Virgil Nemoianu
(1993); PLAY, LITERATURE, RELIGION: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
& Robert Royal eds., 1992); REDRAWING THE BOUNmES: THE TRANSFORmATION OF ENGLISH
AND AmERIcAN LrERARY STUDIES (Stephen Greenblatt & Giles Gunn eds., 1992); ARTHUR
SCHLESINGER,

THE

DISuNrING OF AMERICA:

REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

(1991);

BARBARA HER NSTEiN SMrrH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
FOR CRITICAL THEORY (1988); PETER N. STEARNS, MEANING OVER MEmORY: RECASING THE
TEACHING OF CULTURE AND HISTORY (1993); Hazard Adams, Canons: Literary Power/Power

Criteria, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 748 (1988); Frank Kermode, Institutional Control of Interpretation, 43 SALmAGIJNDi 72 (1979) [hereinafter Kermode, Institutional Control]; Peter L. McLaren,
Culture or Canon? Critical Pedagogy and the Politics of Literacy, 58 HARv. ED. REV. 213
(1988); Robert Scholes, Aiming a Canon at the Curriculum,72 SALMAGUNDI 101 (1986); Cornell
West, Minority Discourse and the Pitfalls of Canon Formation, 1 YALE J.CRmcisM 193 (1987).

10. George Allan has assessed the roots of the canon debate accurately. "The firestorms of
deCanonization sweep unabated through the sacred groves of academe. Philosophers who 'take
time seriously,' who make Becoming instead of Being the base of their ontology, provide the
metaphysical framework for this attack, although they are rarely credited with doing so." George
Allan, The Process and Reality of an Educational Canon, 12 CoNTEMP. PHIL. 3, 4 (1989).
11. C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at ix (1879). In
terms of the theory of the legal classic that is developed in this Article, Langdell's casebook is
accurately described as a classic, even if it has fallen from canonical grace under the withering

attacks by antiformalists and antifoundationalists.
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critical race theorists, and the more esoteric deconstructionists immediately
come to mind as challenges to the canon. For example, contemporary critics challenge Langdell's self-assurance to the extent that it persists in the
production of modem contracts casebooks. 12 As legal theorists explicitly
begin to debate the canon against this backdrop, the canon-bashers are
likely to gamer an immediate consensus judgment that they have won the
debate. There is no sport more enjoyed among contemporary legal theorists
than vilifying Langdell's legacy. The interesting question is whether anyone will have the temerity to defend vigorously the idea of a legal canon.13
Traditional scholars will consider talk of a legal system without a legal
canon as virtually incoherent, regardless of the ascendancy of critical challenges to the canon. After all, Webster's Dictionaryoffers "law" as a synonym for "canon." 14 A disciplining canon appears to be indispensable to
rule-governed legal practice; it marks the difference between the rule of law
and the exercise of arbitrary authority. From the traditional perspective, the
fact that the legal system operates in a relatively predictable manner underscores the existence and operation of a legal canon. Attempts to do away
with the legal canon amount to lawlessness, traditionalists will argue, because the law necessarily speaks through canonical texts that are read according to the accepted canons of interpretation. Rather than join in a
debate that they will lose in the pages of the leading law reviews, however,
many traditionalists undoubtedly will go about their doctrinal business, resting content with the knowledge that the attack on the canon is meaningless
verbiage that will not disrupt the actual workings of the legal system.
In 1993, the Association of American Law Schools acknowledged the
significance of the canon debate for legal education by announcing as the
theme for its annual meeting: "Multiple Cultures and the Law: Do We Have
a Legal Canon?" AALS President Emma Coleman Jordan elaborated as
follows:
This AALS Annual Meeting coincides with a tension-filled moment in intellectual history. In every discipline, scholarly organizations are experiencing definitional debate over the central
functions of the academy: pedagogy, research, and scholarship.
12. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1020 n.70, 1060 n.240 (1985); Mary J.Frug, Re-reading Contracts:A Feminist Analysis
of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065, 1065-70 (1985). With regard to the particular
issues raised by curricular choices, legal educators regularly debate issues of fundamental curricular reform with the goal of escaping the canonical model fashioned by Langdell, even though most
curricula remain disappointingly familiar.
13. Derrick A. Bell, Introduction, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2 (1993) ("What in other disciplines
is called directly 'the canon debate' is present in legal education... it is hard to imagine that the
law-as-doctrine defenders will be able to forestall the sweeping reforms now taking place in other
areas of the academy.").
14. WEasTaER's TamrD New INTERNATIONAL DicrmoNAY 328 (unabridged ed. 1986).
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The "canon debate," that is, argument over what constitutes this
core of knowledge and methodology that we hope to transmit in
the universities, has been particularly pronounced in fields such
as literature and history. New ideas about how to read texts, and
new definitions of history, have obvious implications for legal
scholars. American law schools have begun a version of the "canon debate."'
Rather than arriving too late, legal theorists appear to have caught the wave
of the canon debate. The nascent canon debate in legal academe promises
to bring new focus and vitality to perennial jurisprudential questions. The
debate need not degenerate into a battle between self-congratulatory articles
exuding critical fervor and self-satisfied articles clinging to either a formalist or romantic ideal of law. The debate over the legal canon threatens to be
a non-starter; properly pursued, however, it might provide the kind of practical focus that invigorates the theoretical discourse of the larger canon debate. Legal scholars must develop a new framework for discussing the idea
of a legal canon if the discussion is to be worth pursuing. This Article
outlines the grammar of a productive framework within which the promise
of the canon debate can be realized.
The canon debate not only raises fundamental questions about effective and desirable forms of teaching and lawyering, it also implicates fundamental philosophical questions about how we understand, transmit, and
participate in cultural traditions. Without denigrating the very important
claims that multiculturalist critics of the canon continue to make against the
traditional legal curriculum and standard conceptions of legal practice, this
Article moves beyond these claims and describes the cultural forces that
generate not only curricular biases, but also the prejudiced structure of social life. Using the mature work of literary theorists to initiate the debate
over the legal canon-this Article will enable legal scholars to avoid some
of the unproductive pejorative stances that have sidetracked the wider canon debate. Past debates regarding the literary canon serve as a prologue of
rich resources for fashioning a pointed and challenging discussion of the
philosophical questions raised by the idea of a legal canon. Addressing
these questions from the perspective of the legal canon makes sense because legal practice, scholarship, and education bring these themes to bear
within a more practical context than literary writing, criticism, and educa15.

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW ScHooLs ANNUAL Mnm'JG PROORAM,

MULTcUL-

Do WE HAVE A LEGAL CANON? 71 (San Francisco, January 5-9, 1993).
Four of the papers presented at the Plenary Session are reprinted in the Journalof Legal Education. See Bell, supra note 13; Stanley Fish, Not of an Age, But for All Time: Canons and
TURALISM AND THE LAW:

Postmodernism, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1993); Patricia N. Limerick, The Canon Debate From a

Historian'sPerspective, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 4 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal
Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22 (1993).
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tion provide. A skeptic might (wrongly) regard the debate over the literary
canon as grubby academic in-fighting clothed with mistaken romantic visions of the power of literature and the significance of literary criticism. In
contrast, the power of the legal system is an undeniable and palpable feature
of everyday life that elevates the importance of the debate over the legal
canon.
Part I of this Article provides a sketch of the debate over the literary
canon, a debate that often is marked by efforts to caricature an opponent's
position. 16 After reviewing several challenges to the legal canon, Part II
compares these challenges to the canon debate in literature.' 7 In this way,
the Article demonstrates that legal scholarship appears poised to follow the
unhelpful stances that define much of the debate over the literary canon.
Principally by assessing Charles Altieri's recent book, Canons and Consequences, Part III analyzes efforts by several literary theorists to adopt a
more measured approach to the canon debate by describing the cognitive
significance of the canon as a dynamic projection of public identity. 18 Part
IV then identifies limitations in Altieri's discussion and demonstrates that
Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical explanation of how the classics bear
truth for contemporary readers supplements Altieri's approach and establishes a viable framework for questioning the idea of a legal canon. 9
Gadamer's analysis of classical texts plays a central role in his ontological
inquiry into understanding, opening a fruitful line of inquiry that has been
pursued in the context of literary criticism. Gadamer's discussion of classical texts forms the core of the suggested framework for approaching the
debate over the legal canon. Part V explores the significance of these findings by discussing the English contracts case, Hadley v. Baxendale,2 ° which
is a common-law classic.2 '
The Article concludes by suggesting that deconstructing the idea of a
legal canon, in itself, will not stimulate ongoing jurisprudential inquiry.2 2
The interesting question is what we will do after we have deconstructed the
legal canon. The correct focus of this more engaging question is an analysis of the power of the legal classic. Construing the legal canon as a product of hegemonic cultural forces serving the interests of elite segments of
society yields certain undeniable benefits. However, this critical attitude
should not obscure the inevitable cognitive role played by the legal classic.
16. See infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra notes 55-112 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 141-84 and accompanying text.
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
See infra notes 185-216 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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The legal classic is not the (conscious or unconscious) product of subjective
self-interest, but rather is productive of selves and self-interests.
I.

CANONICAL CARICATURES

Before discussing the canon debate, it is important to unpack the varied meanings called forth by the word "canon." The etymology of "canon"
reveals its root in the Greek word kanon ("rod, measuring line"), which in
Old English came to signify a "model [or] standard."'2 3 The first dictionary
definition regards the theological usage in this sense, defining canon as "a
decree, decision, regulation, code, or constitution made by ecclesiastical authority. '24 The secularized version of this sense of canon is expressed as "a
norm, criterion, model, or standard for evaluating, judging, testing or criticizing."' The idea of a canon as a disciplining rule of evaluation plays an
important role in the canon debate.
A "canon" is a rule, a set of instructions. It is what people in
authority use to define what those under their jurisdiction are supposed to do.... What canons do to people is what cannons do to
projectiles and canyons to rivers.
"A general rule, fundamental principle, aphorism or axiom
governing the systematic or scientific treatment of a subject": this
second of the [Oxford English Dictionary] definitions is the
properly educational sense of a canon.
The role of any canon is to distinguish the essential from the
accidental, a basic core from what is merely illustrative, of momentary interest and passing relevance.26
Thus, in a very important sense, a canon is believed to be the means by
which truth is separated from illusion and thereby preserved against heretical claims.
The canon more iecently has come to signify the result achieved by the
disciplining rule of evaluation-namely, an authoritative list of the central
23. WEBSTER'S THmD NEw NmTERNATIONAL DIcIoNARY, supra note 14, at 328.

24. Id. Therefore, the modem idea that canonization reflects an acknowledgment that the
text exhibits an objective, timeless quality of formal excellence is removed from the earliest uses
of the word.
Hence the "canonizers" of early Christianity were not concerned with how beautiful
texts were, nor with how universal their appeal might be. They acted with a very clear
concept of how texts would "measure up" to the standards of their religious community,
or conform to their "rule.' They were concerned above all else with distinguishing the
orthodox from the heretical.
Guillory, supra note 8, at 233.
25. WEnsma's THmRD NEW INTERNAnONAL DIcrIoNARY, supra note 14, at 328.
26. Allan, supra note 10, at 3.
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texts within a culture. Webster's Dictionaryarticulates this second sense by
also defining "canon" as "an accepted or sanctioned list of books. 2' 7 In this
sense, the literary canon is regarded as a cultural repertoire from which
contemporary readers can recover and reanimate the best that the tradition
has to offer. In a sophisticated development of this perspective, Charles
Altieri argues that canons constitute "a normative archive sustaining those
powers and states of being that offer the fullest possible education in a
version of what the culture's history makes possible."2 8 The canon does not
necessarily represent an eternal list of texts, but at any given time it is presumed to constitute a relatively stable "archive" of the texts that define the
culture.
These two uses of the term "canon" are closely related. A rule of
evaluation that separates the sacred from the sacrilegious is known only in
its use to demarcate the collection of sacred texts. Similarly, the roster of
sacred texts can be identified only on the basis of the standard by which
sacred is defined. This relationship between rule and result lies at the heart
of the canon debate. On one hand, critics of the traditional canon are not
troubled so much with the idea of literary anthologies as they are with the
subterranean cultural prejudices that serve as the canonical standard of admission to this elite circle.2 9 On the other hand, these critics bemoan cultural prejudices precisely because they effectively promote a self-sustaining
cultural ideology of exclusion through the canonical collection of privileged
texts.3" The interplay and mutual dependencies of canonization and the resulting canon must be described and explained before the canon debate can
produce real insight that will foster social change.
The idea of a canon, in the full (dual) sense of the word, immediately
appears dubious to a generation that has celebrated critical theory, poststructuralism and, more recently, postmodernism. Establishing an authoritative standard to define canonical texts raises the specter of tyranny
because any such rule might be grounded in ideology or defended through
the use of force rather than being redeemed in rational and open discourse.
A deeper critique questions whether it is ever possible for a given universal
27. WEBsTER's T-mu NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 328.
28. ALrmRi, supra note 9, at 16.
29. For example, Stanley Fish has no problem with the Norton Publishing Company's creating literary anthologies now that we acknowledge the need for multiple anthologies, each of which
draws on a different canon within our pluralistic society that has cultural significance equal to that
of competing canons. Stanley Fish, Canon Busting: The BasicIssues, NAT'L FORUM: Pi KAPPA
PHi J., Summer 1989, at 13, 14.
30. Thus, Barbara Hermstein Smith argues that including a work within an anthology does
not simply acknowledge the work's value, it also serves in a very real sense to establish its value.
Barbara Hermstein Smith, Contingencies of Value, CRMcAL INQUIRY, Sept. 1983, at 1, 25. Despite multiple anthologies within society, the danger remains that society reinforces "establishment ideologies" through the process of anthologizing. Id. at 30.
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rule to guide an evaluation of texts, since judgment is the practice of
case-by-case decisionmaking and is never the mere logical subsumption of
a particular case under a general concept. 3' According to this view, lurking
behind every publicly offered canonical rule are social practices that continually shape the judgments which fashion the canon. Regardless of which
critical perspective informs the theorist, every invocation of the canon is
problematic because it invites a critical appraisal to preclude dogmatism
and oppression. Moreover, the belief that a small collection of texts, however chosen, can represent the cultural life of modem society seems romantically nostalgic at best and imperialistic at worst. The recent fixation on
the politics of special interests appears to reflect a deep, fundamental heterogeneity within American culture. In short, both senses of the canon appear
outdated when viewed through modem, critical eyes.
In response to these destabilizing conditions, the literary canon debate
largely has emerged in polarized form, offering a grand "Either/Or." This
polarization occurs because each side tends to caricature its opponent's position as dogmatic and unrealistic, and also because each side presents its
own position in a pre-scripted, polemical form designed to stake out the
perceived radical distance between the contestants in the debate. The stark
Either/Or framework of the canon debate amounts to a battle between the
idea that there is a universal essence of civilized humanity which must be
nurtured by preserving the great achievements of high culture and the idea
that our culture necessarily is a heteronomous admixture of incommensurable traditions which calls for a celebration of difference.
Traditionalists defending the canon do not regard the increasing fragmentation in society as something to be celebrated; rather, they view it as a
failure of American cultural institutions-primarily the education systemto instill in all citizens an appreciation of universal human essences that
Western culture nurtures.32 "Traditional appeals for a high canon have relied on hypotheses about some central core of human experience that pervades cultural change and enables us to test and preserve those works most
fully expressive of that humanity."3 3 Fragmentation is a symptom of the
ongoing cultural decline that must be halted if we are to preserve cherished
freedoms and sensibilities. 'These defenders of a traditional canon propose
the definition and transmission of a core of classic works as an antidote to
31. HANs-GEoRG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 31 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Mar-

shall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (originally published as WAirr Ui'i METHODE in 1960).
Gadamer extends Kant's premise that reflective judgment is not exercised in accordance with a
priori concepts, but rather is the faculty of applying the concepts of understanding. See generally
IMMANUEL KANT,CRrMQUt oF JUDGMENr (J.H. Bernard trans., 1951) (1790).
32. This idea is stated most forcefully by Allan Bloom. See BLOOM, supra note 5, at 336-82
(defending the civilizing mission of a liberal education).
33. ALTmmi, supra note 9, at 52.
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Traditionalists point out that

many multiculturalist advocates in fact impose an equally stringent bias in
favor of liberal Western values by championing only works written by oppressed people who espouse progressive Western ideals such as feminism
or religious toleration.35
Although many traditionalists might acknowledge that cultural forces
have unfairly shaped the anthologies of canonical literature, they will assert
that the historical effects of parochialism and prejudice do not undermine
the core tenets of Western civilization, so much as recommend the freer

admission of all authors who meet the relevant criteria. 6 The traditional
defense of the canon, then, valorizes belonging to a common culture
marked by shared criteria of value.
Frank Kermode has defended the canon vigorously along these lines,
although with a measure of sophistication. 37 Kermode argues that breaking
34. Ansley, supra note 6, at 1514; see also sources cited supra note 5.
35. Dinesh D'Souza makes this point when assessing Stanford's revised curriculum which
includes works by minority and women authors and emphasizes themes of race and gender.
D'SouzA, supra note 5, at 59-93. D'Souza ridicules the "canonization" of Rigoberta Menchu as a
projection by "left-wing" professors "of Marxist and feminist views onto South American Indian
culture." Id. at 72. This critique does not undermine the multiculturalist attack on the canon, but
instead questions the willingness of multiculturalists to adhere to their stated objectives and respect (the often) racist, sexist, or homophobic traditions of non-Western cultures. Of course, not
all literature from the third world gains prominence simply by echoing Western progressive politics. See, e.g., CHINUA ACHEBE, THiNGs FALL APART passim (1959) (presenting a powerfully
ambiguous portrayal of the clash of culture between Christianity/Colonialism and Ibo tribal life),
36. See, e.g., Laurence Lerner, Subverting the Canon, 32 BRrr. J. AEsTHErics 347, 351-52
(1992). Lerner recuperates some overlooked female poets but denies that such an effort holds any
revolutionary consequences because the same criteria defines good poems whether written by
women or men.
This attempt to rehabilitate a couple of woman poets will not obviously make much
difference to the canon of seventeenth-or eighteenth--century poetry, but that does not
mean it is unimportant .... The gains have been obvious: some good poems, and a
fresh perspective on love poetry. But when it comes to establishing alternative criteria
of poetic merit, the success has been very limited .... Opening up discussion of the
canon has led to recuperating individuals but has not yet offered the basis for an alternative canon.
Id. at 358. Lerner argues that the recuperation of individual authors previously overlooked "will
not in principle differ from the rescue of a neglected middle class white male (there are plenty of
those too)." Id. at 350; cf.Guillory, supra note 8, at 234-40 (contending that although canonization is not a crude exclusionary dogma, the force of the canonical resides in its institutionalized
definition of who shall read and write at all).
37. Kermode effectively attacks "the imperialist position" advocated by T.S. Eliot, in which
the classics are seen as definitive statements of an unfolding unitary history. FRANK KERMODE,
Tir CLAssIc: LITERARY IMAGES OF PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 20, 27-28, 38 (1975) (criticizing
T.S. Eliot, What is a Classic?, reprinted in ON POETRY AND POETS 53-71 (1957)). Kermode

argues that classics of relatively recent vintage, such as Wuthering Heights, "[u]nlike the old
classic, which was expected to provide answers, [pose] a virtually infinite set of questions." Id. at
114. From the first reader, the task always is to respond "creatively to indeterminacies of meaning
inherent in the text and possibly enlarged by the action of time." Id. at 134.
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the authority of the canon is tantamount to destroying the community it
serves.3 8 The canon is an essential feature of any community, for "we have
not found ways of ordering our thoughts about the history of literature and
art without recourse to them."3 9 The canon debate is not really about the
desirability of the canon, but rather about who will exercise control over its
definition.' Kermode explicitly links the canon to the regenerative power
of the institutional context in which it arises, arguing that the canon represents the continuing ability of the institution to make use of its past.4 '
In sharp contrast, critics assert that the traditional canon does not represent a repository of universal and eternal values of civilization; rather, it is
a contingent, historical representation of the values that reinforce the dominant position of certain members of society. Critics thus attack the canon
for precisely the reasons that defenders come to its aid: The canon is linked
to cultural and institutional power and stability. Stanley Fish asserts that
the canon is "a historical, political, and social product, something that is
fashioned by men and women in the name of certain interests, partisan concerns, and social and political agenda."'4 Under this view, the function of a
canon is "not to encourage thought, but to stop it"; therefore, the proper
goal of critical theory is not to repair the traditional canon but to demote it
to one canon among many in a pluralistic society without hierarchical culNevertheless, Kermode also reveals that his historical approach is far from thoroughgoing.
He persists in the belief that "there is a substance that prevails, however powerful the agents of
change," id., and he rejects the idea "that all interpretation of the classic must be at the expense of
the modem," id. at 6-7. Kermode concludes his book by playing down his attacks on the imperial
model of the classic.
The implication remains that the classic is an essence available to us under our dispositions, in the aspect of time. So the image of the imperial classic, beyond time, beyond
vernacular corruption and change, had perhaps, after all, a measure of authenticity; all
we need do is bring it down to earth.
Id. at 141. When the canon debate intensified in the decade after the original publication of this
book, Kermode's defense of the canon became more pronounced.
38. KERmoDE, PoERy, supra note 9, at 75-76 (interview with Michael Payne).
39. KERMODE, HIsTORY, supra note 9, at 117. Kermode argues that canons serve the same
function as the periodization of history, namely by allowing us
to identify with the interests of our predecessors, to qualify their judgements without
necessarily overthrowing them, to converse with them in a transhistorical dimension.
Though inevitably tainted with privilege and injustice, that still seems a valuable inheritance; some catastrophe might conceivably destroy it, but the destruction should not be
encouraged ....Some workable notion of canon, some examined idea of history [are]
necessary even to the desired rehabilitation of the unfairly neglected. So the tradition of
value, flawed as it is, remains valuable.
Id. at 126-27; see also id. at 145.
40. "The canon is what the insurgents mean to occupy as the reward of success in the struggle for power. In short, what we have here is not a plan to abolish the canon but one to capture it."
Id. at 114.
41. KERIm4ODE, PoERy, supra note 9, at 74-75; Kermode, Institutional Control,supra note 9,
at 83-85.
42. Fish, supra note 29, at 13.
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tural arrangements.4 3 By forgoing the traditionalist pipe dream of a unified
culture and embracing "a kind of ethnic carnival or festival of cultures or

ways of life or customs,"' Fish champions a "commitment to exploring as
many canonical traditions as we can make available to us, to learn from
them what we are able to learn."'45 Although every canon is debilitating
under this view, the interplay between a number of canons can limit their

individual stultifying effects. Critics of the canon reject its unitary presumptions in favor of a recognition that our "irreducibly plural traditions"

require us to view "the project of upsetting and reorganizing the canonical
apple cart as intellectually valid and necessary." 46 The challenge to the
canon, then, valorizes the power of distanciating critique from a point

outside the canon, even if the theorist obtains this perspective only by embracing another, incommensurable canon.4 7
The normative impetus behind the critics' pluralistic imperative is "the
conscious bringing in of previously suppressed or ignored histories and nar-

ratives, in the interest of greater justice for the disempowered and a more
effective education for all."4 In its most vigorous form, the critique of the
canon seeks to enhance education not only by listening to the voices of
those previously silenced, but also by reading against every cultural text to
discover the social forces at work sub silento within it. The emerging "crit-

ical historicist" technique of literary criticism "[s]crupulously [locates]
every aspect of the work in its historical setting," with the goal of disrupting
43. Fish, supra note 15, at 12. Of course, critical appraisals of canonical texts and their roles
in cultural history form an important feature of this pluralistic approach. See, e.g., "BAD" SHAra
sPEARE: REVALUATIONS OF THE SHAKESPEARE CANON

passim (Maurice Charney ed., 1988) (col-

lection of essays reexamining many of Shakespeare's famous works and trying to answer the
editor's questions: "Can any of Shakespeare be bad? 'Bad' in what sense?", id. at 9); GARY
A CULTURAL HISTORY FROM THE RESTORATION TO TuE
PRsErr passim (1989) (providing a cultural history of Shakespearean interpretation from the
TAYLOR, RENvENTINO SHAKESPEARE:

Restoration to the present); THE SHAKESPEARE MYTHpassim (Graham Holdemess ed., 1988) (collection of essays challenging the discursive fields and cultural practices associated with the
Shakespearean myth).
44. Richard Bernstein, Academia's Liberals Defend Their Carnival of Canons Against
Bloom's "Killer B's," N.Y. Tmms, Sept. 25, 1988, § 4, at 26 (quoting Stanley Fish).
45. Fish, supra note 29, at 14.

46. Erickson, supra note 8, at 444-45.
47. Cf. PAUL RIcouER, HmENuncs & Ta HUMAN SCIENCES 90 (John B. Thompson
trans., 1981) (describing critical efforts to emancipate the text by means of an "'alienating distanciation'-Verfremdung-which commands the objectifying attitude of the human sciences").
Many critics of the canon reject the naive scientism evidenced in some ideology critique, but they
continue to celebrate "alienating distanciation" as a key feature of their perspectival approach.
See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
48. Ansley, supra note 6, at 1514 (noting the sources cited in n.5); see, e.g., Edmund W.
Gordon & Maitrayee Bhattacharyya, Human Diversity, Cultural Hegemony, and the Integrity of
the Academic Canon, 61 J. NEGRO EDuc. 405, 409-14 (1992); Anthony M. Platt, Defenders of the
Canon: What's Behind the Attack on Multiculturalism, SOCIAL JUSICE, Summer 1992, at 122,

134-36.
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the text's claim to truth by tying it "back into the nexus of historical pressures it sought to resolve and hence escape."4 9 The reader using this technique attempts to elucidate the contingent values of the present by
historicizing and demythologizing the cultural forms of the past that the text
represents. Along these lines, Jerome McGann argues that readers must
resist being controlled by the power of the text by recognizing that reading
only "works through a structure of reciprocals," and that readers thereby are
empowered to take charge of the text.5 McGann promotes active reading

that
49. ALTmRiU, supra note 9, at 22 (criticizing Jerome J. McGann, The Meaning of the Ancient
Mariner, 8 C~urncAL INQUIRY 35 (1981)). Altieri uses the term "critical historicism" to refer to
the loosely affiliated movement generally known as "New Historicism," following Stephen
Greenblatt's use of this term to describe the works collected in an early symposium. See Stephen
J. Greenblatt, Introduction to Symposium, The Forms of Power and the Power of Forms in the
Renaissance, 15 GENqRE 3, 5-6 (1982). New historicist scholarship is featured in Representations,
a journal that Greenblatt co-edits. Greenblatt's succinct definition of New Historicism underscores its anti-formalist tenor:
For me the study of the literary is the study of contingent, particular, intended, and
historically embedded works; if theory inevitably involves the desire to escape from
contingency into a higher realm, a realm in which signs are purified of the slime of
history, then this paper is written against theory.
Stephen J. Greenblatt, Shakespeare and the Exorcists, in CONTEMPORARY LrrEARY CRrICISM
428, 429 (Robert C. Davis & Ronald Schleifer eds., 2d ed. 1989). New Iistoricism is defined in
opposition to traditional historicist demands "that the textual critic try to achieve as complete an
imaginative recovery of his past author as was possible." JEROME J.McGANN, A CRITIQUE OF
MODERN TEXTuAL CRrnclsM 117 (1983). McGann criticizes the overly narrow preoccupation
with final authorial intentions as a specialized historical inquiry, arguing that intentions must in
turn "be embedded in the broad cultural contexts which alone can explain and elucidate them."
Id. at 123.
For varying examples or appraisals of this strategy of criticism, see STEPHEN J. GREENBLATr,
LEARNING TO CURsE: EssAYS IN EARLY MODERN CULTURE (1990); STEPHEN J. GREENBLA-rr,
SHAKESPEAREAN NEGOTIATIONS: THE CIRCULATION OF SocIAL ENERGY IN RENAISSANcE ENGLAND 94-129 (1988); KERMODE, PoErRY, supra note 9, at 49-67; JEROME J. McGANN, THE RoMANTIC IDEOLOGY: A CaICAL INVESTIGATION 21-31 (1983); JEROME J. McGANN, SOcIAL

VALUES AND PoErc Acts: THE HISTORICAL JUDGMENT OF LITERARY WORK 95-196 (1988); JE-

ROME J. McGANN, THE TEXTUAL CONDrTIoN 68-128 (1991) [hereinafter McGANN, TEXTUAL
CoN orrioN]; JEROME J.McGApN, TOWARDS A LITERATURE OF KNOWLEDGE passim (1989) [hereinafter McGANN, LITERATURE OF KNOWLEDGE]; ROBERT SCHOLES, TEXTUAL POWER: LITERARY

THEORY AND THE TEAcrmNG OF ENGLISH 1-17 (1985); Tan NEW HISTORICiSM passim (Harold
Aram Veeser ed., 1989); David Simpson, Literary Criticism and the Return to "History", 14
CRmCAL INQUIRY 721, 721-25 (1988).
New Historicism literary criticism has some affinities with Marxist conceptions of history.
ALTrEpI, supra note 9, at 325 n.1 (citing TERRY EAGLETON, CRrICISM AND IDEOLOGY: A STUDY
IN MARxIsT LITERARY THEORY 430 (1976)); see also KERMODE, HISTORY, supra note 9, at 98-103
(discussing Marxist scholars Terry Eagleton and Frederic Jameson). Nevertheless, it is perhaps
not accurate to describe New Historicism as Marxist. See Catherine Gallagher, Marxism and the
New Historicism, in THE NEw IHIsTOuCiSM, supra, at 37 passim; Stephen J.Greenblatt, Towards
a Poetics of Culture, in THE NEw HISTORiciSM, supra, at 1 passim; Robert C. Davis & Ronald
Schleifer, Marxism and New Historicism, in CONTEMPORARY LrrERARY CRrriCiSM, supra, at 369
passim.
50. McGANN, TExTUAL CONDrTION, supra note 49, at 119.
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involves decoding one or more of the contexts that interpenetrate
the scripted and physical text. It necessitates some kind of abstraction from what appears most immediately.
Even under the best of circumstances, messages and their
senders are neither innocent nor completely reliable. This is why
readers must be prepared to defend themselves against both the
errors and the perversions of those who communicate with
51
texts.
Critical historicist scholars regard society as fragmented not only horizontally-between different subcultures-but also vertically-across time.
At its most basic level, the canon controversy is a debate between the
faithful believers in belonging and the skeptical masters of distanciating
critique. Of course, no contestant adopts one of these caricatured positions
entirely. Neither position, reduced to its pure theoretical essence, is a realistic portrayal of the experience of reading literature. To privilege belonging, one must demarcate the "we" who belong and presume that this "we" is
shaped in an important way by the power of canonical literature. A critical
inquiry into the effects of this power seems to flow inevitably from the
presuppositions of committed defenses of belonging. Similarly, to privilege
distanciating critique, one must criticize something-which itself requires
an admission that a hegemonic canon is a powerful force in society. Acknowledging that someone must belong before she is in a position to distance herself critically from that position seems unavoidable. As we might
well expect, challenges to the canon often derive their rhetorical power
from the very canon they place in question.52
The canonical caricatures break down, as all caricatures do, when carefully analyzed. And yet, each caricature bears strong resemblance to a reasonable articulation of how we encounter texts. In a different context, the
51. Id. at 119, 128. Charles Altieri offers this characterization:
The past as essentially a record of ideological struggle, the present as a domain we
liberate from that past by inaugurating disbelief and analyzing ideological
overdeterminations, and the future as a conflict among the competing self-interests that
determine critical stances-these are the stuff the dreams of contemporary theory are
increasingly made on.
ALTm, supra note 9, at 24.
52. One commentator who attempts to avoid the grand Either/Or of the canon debate points
out that position papers from the critics of the canon
are usually composed as if addressed to audiences steeped in the traditional canon.
Even so hostile a witness as Maria Margaronis suggests that, "we have nothing to
change but our minds," assuming that her audience will respond to the twisting of
Marx's famous phrase, which is by now a part of the canon, if only as that reflex-born
counter-canon.
R.T. Smith, Canon Fodder, The CulturalHustle, and the Minotaur Deep in the Maze, 69 NAT'L

FORUM: Pmi KAPPA Pmi J. 25, 27 (1989).
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philosopher Paul Ricoeur eloquently described the competing, yet mutually
dependent, images at work in this debate. Ricoeur noted that understanding
embodies a double motivation:
willingness to suspect, willingness to listen; vow of rigor, vow of
obedience. In our time we have not finished doing away with
idols and we have barely begun to listen to symbols. It may be
that this situation, in its apparent distress, is instructive: it may be
that extreme iconoclasm belongs to the restoration of meaning.5 3
My own interrogation proceeds from this observation. Would it
not be appropriate to shift the initial locus of the hermeneutical
question, to reformulate the question in such a way that a certain
dialectic between the experience of belonging and alienating distanciation becomes the mainspring, the key to the inner life, of
hermeneutics?5 4
Ricoeur's apt diagnosis suggests that it is necessary to erase the caricatures
and approach the canon debate from a more nuanced, subtle perspective.
Before discussing efforts to rehabilitate the idea of a literary classic along
these lines, Part II describes the emerging debate over the legal canon that
threatens to follow the caricatures established in literary criticism.
II.

A.

CHALLENGING THE LEGAL CANNON

The Existence of a Legal Canon

Traditional scholars might question whether the debate regarding the
literary canon can or should hold any relevance for legal theorists. Comparing judgments of aesthetic worth that define the literary canon with judgments about the texts and interpretive strategies comprising the legal canon
appears to confuse two fundamentally different enterprises. Traditionalists
might agree that literary canons are constructed in accordance with the
shifting tastes of a pluralistic, interpretive community while maintaining
that the legal canon is defined simply as the law in force at any given time.
There are no options for inclusion in the hierarchical legal canon, under this
view, because a text either has the normative force of binding law or it does
not. A decade ago, Owen Fiss stressed the limitations of the law and literature movement in similar terms.
Judges do not belong to an interpretive community as a result of
shared views about particular issues or interpretations, but belong
by virtue of a commitment to uphold and advance the rule of law
itself. They belong by virtue of their office. There can be many
schools of literary interpretation, but as Jordan Flyer put it, in
53. PAUL RICOEUR, FREuD AND PHILosoPHy: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 27 (Denis Savage trans., 1970).
54. RicoEuR, supra note 47, at 90.
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legal interpretation there is only one school and attendance is
mandatory.... The presence of... procedures and a hierarchy of
authority for resolving disputes that could potentially divide or
destroy an interpretive community is one of the distinctive fea-

tures of legal interpretation. 5
Using H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudential terminology, the legal canon is differentiated from the literary canon by virtue of a clearly stated rule of recognition that identifies authoritative texts and a clearly stated rule of
adjudication that specifies the manner in which disputes over the interpretation of these texts shall be resolved. 6
Although the argument against extending the canon debate from literature to law has superficial appeal,.a closer analysis uncovers the unwar-

ranted assumptions girding this argument. First, it is question-begging to
characterize the legal canon as a self-defining collection of all authoritative

legal texts. This is the equivalent of defining the literary canon as the sum
of all works of literature that have been published at any given time. This
apparently clever move accomplishes little more than suggesting that we
57
are able to demarcate the boundaries between legal and non-legal texts.
Moreover, the assertion that the legal canon is coincident with the entire

body of texts having the normative force of binding law is demonstrably
false. There are innumerable appellate court opinions that resolve the case

at hand but do not have any impact on the development of the law; they
recede into obscurity forever without gaining even the fleeting notoriety of

inclusion in string citations for the first few years following their publication.58 Additionally, subsequent judicial gloss quickly can eclipse the text
of a statute or regulation to the point that courts rarely consult the text
directly.5 9 There are innumerable texts that, quite simply, play no role in
55. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. Rnv. 739, 746-47 (1982).
56. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 92-96 (1961).
57. This should not be interpreted as minimizing the distinctions between law and literature,
nor as suggesting that the relatively determinate rule of recognition operative in legal practice is
insignificant. The questions raised by the canon debate remain pertinerit, however, because they
focus not on the relatively abstract question of defining law, but rather on the more practical
questions of how law is or should be practiced, critically analyzed, and taught.
58. Even decisions of the United States Supreme Court reported with a full opinion can
recede into obscurity without ever being cited. See, e.g., Hallenbeck v. Leimert, 295 U.S. 116
(1935) (reversing a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit regarding the
liability of an indorser on a negotiable instrument). Entering the search "Hallenbeck w/5 Leimert"
in the LEXIS Mega Library on February 19, 1994 revealed no cases citing Hallenbeck, The irony
of citing this case does not escape me, but it would be equally ironic to dredge up a citation to a
novel that has never influenced writers, critics, or teachers.
59. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (providing that every contract, combination, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade is illegal). Under the rubric of a "rule of reason," courts have ignored the
unqualified language of the statute and have attempted instead to implement the underlying public
policy of fostering competitive conditions in the national economy. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978).
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legal practice, scholarship, or education, even though they have the force of
law, just as there are innumerable novels that play no role in the growth,
development, or establishment of literary styles and themes. Equating the
legal canon with all currently valid law, therefore, posits an overbroad
definition.
Restricting the definition of the legal canon to authoritative statements
of law is underinclusive as well. The law is not static, it is constantly
changing. 0 A comprehensive legal canon would have to include those
texts that inform changes in the law without themselves having the force of
law. Repealed statutes and overruled court decisions can remain influential
to the extent that they define and shape current positive law by negative
implication. Secondary materials similarly can gain prominence as canonical texts that influence the development of law, as occurs with reports of
legislative history, restatements of the law, treatises, and law review articles. Thus, there is no firm line circumscribing the list of canonical legal
texts, because interpretive decisions are informed by texts outside the scope
of binding legal pronouncements. 6
Once we abandon the facile definition of the legal canon as all enforceable law, the fundamental similarities in the creation and operation of the
legal and literary canons become apparent. 6 2 Comparing the goals and
methods of educating students in literature and in law reveals these similarities. If the legal canon were simply a collection of all authoritative rules
within the legal system, one would expect course books to resemble detailed Sum and Substance outlines, and classroom pedagogy to resemble bar
review "cram"' courses. This, happily, is not the case in legal education for
the same reason that reading CliffNotes of literary masterpieces could never
provide an adequate education into the literary canon. The goal of teaching
students to "think like a lawyer" is closely analogous to the goal of instilling a critical capacity in students through the study of literature. Law
professors routinely discriminate between good judicial opinions and bad
60. H.L.A. Hart acknowledged the need for a secondary rule of change. H.L.A. HART, supra
note 56, at 93.
61. It would be curious, for example, to exclude Professors White and Summers's treatise on
commercial law from the legal canon given that it is an extremely influential text for counselors,
advocates, judges, and educators. See JAMES J. WurrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNWORM COMMERCLAL CODE (3d ed. 1988). Entering the search "White w/10 Summers w/15 'Uniform Commercial Code"' in the LEXIS Mega Library on February 19, 1994 revealed 2,744 cases citing the
treatise, including six United States Supreme Court opinions.
62. This Article argues that the law and literature movement in the 1970s and 1980s was
entirely correct in its central theme that law is a form of literature in a very important sense.
However, I have distinguished my approach from some of the approaches adopted by law and
literature adherents. See Francis J. Mootz m, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics:A
ProposedModel of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer,Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L.

Rav. 523, 556-65 (1988).
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judicial opinions, as well as between good student arguments and bad stu-

dent arguments. This practice reinforces an underlying assumption that the
practice of law entails more than a mechanical application of authoritative
general rules to particular factual circumstances. Legal practice demands
that a lawyer exhibit good judgment when choosing strategies or arguments
and that a lawyer employ effective rhetorical techniques to persuade others

that her strategies or arguments should prevail. If we define the legal canon
as the collection of texts and interpretive rules that serve as the resource for
effective lawyering and good judging, rather than adopting a sterile syllogism by equating the legal canon with currently valid law, then the legal
canon has strong affinities with the literary canon. Consequently, legal
scholars are beginning to acknowledge that the debate over the literary ca-

non has something important to say about the legal canon.63
63. This does not suggest that writing and reading legal texts is no different from writing and
reading literary texts, but rather that there is no ontological distinction that precludes comparison
of these textual activities. In an important essay describing the hermeneutical significance of the
text, Hans-Georg Gadamer characterizes legal texts as "a phase in the execution of the communicative event" that requires creative interpretation. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Text and Interpretation,
in DIALOGuE AND DECONSTRUCTON: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER 35 (Diane P.
Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds., Dennis J. Schmidt & Richard E. Palmer trans., 1990). In
contrast, Gadamer states that literary texts do not "disappear in our act of understanding them but
stand there confronting our understanding" as texts "in the highest degree." Id. at 41-42.
Gadamer plainly is correct that legal texts are relatively more communicative while literary texts
are relatively more persistently evocative, but he comes close to giving too conservative an account of legal interpretation-at least with respect to the contemporary American common law
system in which adjudication plays a prominent role notwithstanding, and due in part, to the
explosion of statutes and regulations.
The important point, for present purposes, is acknowledged by Gadamer when he convincingly rebuts any attempt to posit an ontological divide between legal understanding and aesthetic
understanding.
The difference between a literary work of art and any other text is not so fundamental. . . . All written works [whether poetry or scientific prose] have a profound
community in that language is what makes the contents meaningful. In this light, when
texts are understood by, say, a historian, that is not so very different from their being
experienced as art. And it is not mere chance that the concept of literature embraces not
only works of literary art but everything passed down in writing ....
The mode of being of a text has something unique and incomparable about it.
supra note 31, at 163. Compare id. at 101-69 ("Part I, ch. II: The Ontology of the
Work of Art and Its Hermeneutical Significance") with id. at 324-41 ("Part II, ch. II(2)(c): The
Recovery of the Fundamental Hermeneutic Problem-The Exemplary Significance of Legal
Hermeneutics").
For a recent assessment and articulation of this aspect of the "law and literature" movement,
see Lawrence Joseph, Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1227 passim
(1993). Joseph looks at "what poetry says about language" as a means to "disclose what one of
our society's most vital languages, the language of law, means at this time." Id. at 1229. Joseph
concludes that a "pragmatist realizes that adjudicative language must be brought closer to the
realities of language itself." Id. at 1254.
GADAMER,
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When discussing challenges to the legal canon, it is important to acknowledge that there is no single, determinate, and acontextual legal canon,
just as there is no single, determinate, and acontextual literary canon. Literary criticism and legal scholarship are practices in their own right, albeit
second-order practices, and these critical practices have their own canonical
exemplars. Additionally, the materials selected to teach both literature and
law students constitute curricular canons of pedagogically appropriate
materials. Finally, the texts that define and develop the principles of law
underlying legal practice constitute the legal analogue to the "great" works
of literature that define and develop the literary tradition. Although it is
quite appropriate to distinguish between these different canons as a conceptual matter, as a practical matter each of these venues of canonization
within the law relate to the others in a fundamental way. For example, it
makes little sense to talk about a curricular canon that in fact is distinct in
any important sense from the scholarly canon and the canon of important
legal materials. A curricular canon, although conceptually distinct, invariably must include important cases and statutes, as well as important critical
perspectives for assessing the cases and statutes.' 4
The parallels between literary and legal canons regarding curricular
choices and critical commentary seem uncontroversial. However, many
theorists might argue that it is inappropriate to draw a comparison between
the canon that informs legal practice and the canon of great works of literature that shape literary creation. It might appear that the legal canon is
determinant and constraining, whereas the literary canon is fluid and suggestive. It is true that the normative force of a law is inherent in its status as
law, while the normative force of literature is earned in its exemplificative
power. A legal text having the force of law is much more a performative
text than an evocative text. Nevertheless, no lawyer approaches the comprehensive collection of authoritative legal texts as a pre-given, uncontroversial, and self-explanatory fact. Lawyers and judges work within the
law, teasing out the ambiguities and inconsistencies that provide the space
for a creative interpretation that will alter the law. Hence, lawyers speak of
"discovering" a law that has long been on the books, a process which might
signal the first steps toward canonization.
In contrast, a practitioner of literature-a writer or poet as opposed to
a literary critic-is never freed from the preceding tradition and delivered
64. For instance, the canon of important legal texts influences the decision whether to spend
three class days, one class day, or none at all discussing the doctrine of unconscionability in a
first-year contracts course. In addition, the canon of important critical perspectives will influence
the decision whether to include material that analyzes the impact of unconscionability litigation
according to the value of efficient commerce, the value of fostering appropriate consideration of
the interests of women and minorities, or neither.
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unto a realm of pure aesthetic creativity, even though the preceding works

of the tradition do not bind the artist in precisely the same manner that legal
precedent binds lawyers and judges. A writer who sits down at a table with
pen in hand is constrained by a pre-reflective conception of what a good

novel looks like no less than a lawyer who sits in the law library with pen in
hand is constrained by a pre-reflective conception of what a good legal
argument looks like. The legal and literary canons each constitute a traditionary force that shapes the creative practices of writing and lawyering.
Although artists have bemoaned the weight of the tradition, astute critics
have recognized what lawyers well know: working within a tradition65is productive of knowledge and creativity, not destructive or oppressive.
B.

Critiquingthe Legal Canon

Legal scholars appear poised to deconstruct the legal canon along the
lines already sketched by literary theorists, with all of the attendant polem-

ics and bitterness. Jerome Culp presages this tumultuous event in a recent
article in which he attacks the idea of a legal canon from the developing
perspective of critical race theory. Noting that legal scholars already "have
begun to discuss what the legal canon should look like even if they do not
do so in terms of canons," Culp contends that dreams of a univocal legal
canon are fantasy. 66 He argues that dropping the now-discredited pretense

of universality and neutrality leaves room for the expression of anger in
65. W. Jackson Bate argues that the "accumulating anxiety" among poets, triggered by the
fear that there is nothing left to do in the wake of the "rich and intimidating legacy of the past," is
misplaced. W. JACKSON BATE, THE BuRDEN OF THE PAST AND THE ENGLISH PouT 3-4 (1970).
Bate contends that eighteenth century poets "lift[ed] the burden of the past" by elevating the
concept of originality to the highest ideal, and eventually, as a consequence of Enlightenment
ideology, as a necessary ideal for artistic merit. Id. at 106-10. Bate argues against this hopeless
fixation on originality and, while agreeing that the artist is circumscribed, he asserts that this
.
condition makes art possible in the first instance.
None of us, as Goethe said, is really very "original" anyway; one gets most of what he
attains in his short life from others. The boldness desired [in artistic creation] involves
directly facing up to what we admire and then trying to be like it.... [Defying the
Enlightenment taboo of returning to the past in fact celebrates] the freedom of man (that
freedom so indispensable to achievement) to follow openly and directly what he most
values.... [This reorientation provides clues as to how to confront] the greatest single
cultural problem we face, assuming that we physically survive: that is, how to use a
heritage, when we know and admire so much about it, how to grow by means of it, how
to acquire our own "identities," how to be ourselves.
Id. at 132-34; see also HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANxmIEy OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY 148
(1973) (arguing that "the covert subject of most poetry for the last three centuries has been the
anxiety of influence, each poet's fear that no proper work remains for him to perform," resulting
in the poet's willful misinterpretation of her predecessors as a mistaken means of asserting her
originality); David Cole, Agon at the Agora: CreativeMisreadingsin the FirstAmendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1986) (extending Bloom's thesis to the work of judges).
66. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., FiringLegal Canonsand Shooting Blanks: Findinga Neutral Way
in the Law, 10 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Rav. 185, 186 (1991). Culp argues that the ascendancy of the
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minority scholarship since "there is much to be angry about."67 Targets of
this anger include even those scholars who are sympathetic to the themes of
critical race theory, but who have not completely allied themselves against
the canon defenders. Culp agrees that many of his white male colleagues
are innocent of any suppression of ideas by people of color and
women. However, they often give aid and comfort to those who
cannot permit changing the legal canon. It is that aid and comfort
that is both dangerous and inconsistent with a canon that represents the result of a useful debate about its creation.6 8
The allusion to assisting the enemy in wartime is not too far-fetched if legal
theorists replicate the polemical debate over the literary canon. Culp's apparent goal is not just the reception of minority scholarship by mainstream
scholars, but also the identification and isolation of its critics.6 9
Legal theorists only now have begun to acknowledge the significance
of the canon debate for framing disputes over the value of different genres
of legal scholarship, the value of certain curricular choices, and the more
general disputes about the effect of canons on the practice of law. This
Article draws parallels between this emerging scholarship and the issues
raised in the debate over the literary canon. Even in its earliest stage, the
debate over the legal canon is generating some of the same conundrums that
emerged in the challenge to the literary canon. These similarities especially
are manifested in a part of the canon debate that recently has attracted a
great deal of attention: questioning whether legal scholarship remains coherent, given the ever-increasing number of highly specialized scholarly

"nonrealist" paradigm in the natural and social sciences precludes the establishment of a unitary
canon. Id. at 190.
67. Id. at 195; see also id. at 191-95.
68. Id. at 194.
69. In a later article criticizing Richard Posner's denigration of black legal scholarship, Culp
emphasizes that his criticisms, including characterizing Judge Posner as a racist, are not meant to
silence white scholars. Instead, he simply demands "answers and participation" regarding issues
of race. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Posneron Duncan Kennedy and RacialDifference: White Authority

in the Legal Academy, 41 DutKE LJ. 1095, 1112 (1992). Nevertheless, it seems apparent that,
from Culp's perspective, there is an enemy camp that will inevitably give the wrong answers even

if they deign to participate in dialogue.
Culp's claim that anger is an important aspect of his scholarship may be interpreted more
charitably as a claim that a first-person narrative description of the effects of oppression on the
author can serve an edifying role in legal scholarship. Cf.PATICIA J. WLLiAmS, THE ALCHE Y

OF RACE AND RicHTs 47-48 (1991) (recounting her now-famous Benetton story and the refusal by
law review editors to publish her account with its original expression of anger). There is an
important difference between telling a story and describing one's reaction to the recounted events
as part of an effort to foster a more productive exchange, as opposed to expressing anger at those
with whom one is speaking on account of their wrongheaded commitments. The former generates
light as well as heat.
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genres that appear to have developed their own separate canons.7 ° Because
this topic strikes at the heart of academic practice, it has drawn varied and
spirited commentary.
Allan Hutchinson contends that increasing minority representation on
law faculties will have a desirable effect on legal scholarship.7 1 Hutchinson
argues that postmodern attention to the socio-political contexts of power
counteracts deconstructive excesses that appear to suggest that all texts are
equal, and he emphasizes that minority writers are more likely, though not
guaranteed, to stimulate fresh views on important political issues that implicate social power.72 Hutchinson explicitly ties this political invigoration to
the literary canon debate, arguing that the legal canon of scholarly perspectives similarly serves as a form of cultural imperialism practiced against
minorities:
All circumstances of the literary canon's selection, production
and dissemination are culturally-situated. Not only do they bolster the prestige of certain largely local and contingent preoccupations, but they exclude and devalue the experiences and interests
of those with other world views: absence is a very telling form of
presence. Presented as a tribute to and celebration of a common
humanity, it is a troubling exercise in cultural imperialism.
In championing the case for a keener and more serious treatment of modem literature, the intention is not to devalue entirely
the literary work that comprises the traditional canon: that would
be the flip-side of the same canonical coin. The aim must be to
re-value it by situating it within a less reverential and more rooted
method of reading and instruction. Shakespeare and other hallowed artists must be read and understood as products of their
own particular socio-cultural context... Apart from their historical interest, such literary offerings will continue to merit and repay continued study as long as and to the extent that they have
something
to say to a culturally diverse and pluralistically tolerant
73
society.
70. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 2, at 1652 (describing the erosion of faith in the idea
of a single model of good legal reasoning by the development of genres like feminist theory and
law and economics that are "highly specialized with separate canons; they have very different
intellectual approaches and scholarly goals that may, in some instances, be mutually critical of
each other").
71. Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The PoliticsofInterpretation,26 NEw ENO. L. Rnv.
1173, 1173 (1992).
72. Hutchinson states that "[i]f deconstruction relieves authors of the burden of authority,
postmodernism reminds readers of the weight of context." Id. at 1188. Black authors bring a new
context to scholarship and lawyering, see id. at 1189, 1197-98, 1214, as exemplified in the career
of Justice Thurgood Marshall, see id. at 1207.
73. Id. at 1200-01, 1205.
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Perhaps unwittingly, Hutchinson subscribes to the critical historicist credo
and endorses increased minority scholarship as a likely means for fostering
the necessary critical distance and reappraisal.7 4
The burgeoning scholarship characterized as critical race theory has
given pause to many theorists concerned with articulating the criteria of
good scholarship. 75 Edward Rubin has argued that legal scholarship is inveterately normative, and that successful legal scholarship supports clearly
elucidated normative premises with rigorous argumentation rooted in empirical data.76 Rubin is wary, though, of normative biases clouding the
evaluation of scholarship critical race theorists have produced, so he offers
a theory of evaluation that enables the evaluator to rise above simple
(prejudiced) intuition. 77 He further argues that the minimal criteria of rational discourse-normative clarity and persuasiveness-must be supplemented by the criteria of good performance-significance within the
tradition and applicability to contemporary concerns.78 The criteria of good
performance require an evaluator to hold his preconceptions in abeyance
and allow legal scholarship from a different genre to raise questions for his
own views. "One way to deal with a divergent work is to use the doubts
and anxieties that such a work generates as a means of tempering one's
judgment."

79

Rubin's theory of evaluation promotes receptivity and self-effacement
in an effort not to foreclose recognition of new approaches such as critical
race theory. Critics charge that Rubin's "friendly call for standards" is mis74. There has been a spirited debate over the merits and significance of critical race theory,
viewed as a particular genre of legal scholarship written predominantly by minority authors. See
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv.L. REv. 1745, 1787-1819
(1989) (questioning the claims to significance made by critical race theorists); Duncan Kennedy,
A CulturalPluralistCaseforAffirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705, 715-16
(criticizing Randall Kennedy by arguing that increasing minority faculty members has the "possibility of (dramatically) improving legal scholarship" and "knock[ing] our socks off"); Richard A.
Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1157, 1161 (criticizing Duncan
Kennedy's "false and sentimental faith [and] lack of realism" that minority professors will provide distinctive contributions to legal scholarship on account of their race); Culp, supra note 67, at
1104-05 (chiding Posner for ignoring black scholarship but then proceeding to criticize it).
75. For an annotation of critical race theory, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical
Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. Rv. 461, 464-516 (1993); see also Symposium, Issues in CriticalRace Theory, 82 CAL.L. REv. (forthcoming May 1994).
76. "To the extent that scholars can persuade policy-oriented decision-makers, they will do
so only by presenting empirical arguments, connected to clearly stated normative positions....
The entire point of standard legal scholarship is to explore and contrast the pragmatic implications
of conflicting normative positions." Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal
Scholarship, 86 MicH. L. REv. 1835, 1887, 1893 (1988).
77. See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for EvaluatingLegal Scholarship, 80
CAL. L. REv. 889, 890-91 (1992).
78. Id. at 912-40.
79. Id. at 962.
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however.8"

placed,
Richard Delgado argues that the evaluator can never
escape from her normative biases, and that different traditions within legal
scholarship are incommensurable.8 1 Delgado reinscribes the grand Either/

Or in the manner in which he describes the incommensurability problem.
"Evaluation... means developing a yardstick, submitting scholarship to

some form of measure. It has overtones of formalism, the notion that law
can be precise-a science-and that every legal question has one right answer."8 2 In analogous fashion, Pierre Schlag trenchantly rejects Rubin's

belief that an evaluator can discipline herself to read diverse scholarship
with an open mind, arguing that there is a much deeper disintegration of

legal scholarship that renders this belief untenable.83 Delgado and Schlag
agree that the struggle to preserve the canon of legal scholarship, even the

tolerant and capacious canon envisioned by Rubin, is whistling in the dark
night of irreducible pluralism. The result is a replay of the unhelpful, caricatural standoff that marks the debate over the literary canon.
Frances Lee Ansley has written a detailed and challenging article in
which she takes up the question of the legal canon in the context of advocating changes in the teaching of the law school core curriculum.' Ansley
notes that feminist and critical race theorists have substantially undermined
the idea of a neutral canon, but her thesis takes an unexpected tack. 85
Rather than criticizing traditional formulations of the legal canon and sug-

gesting alternative canons, Ansley contends that issues of race are virtually
ubiquitous in American law, and that the core curriculum can reflect this
fact without overturning the traditional canon.86 Defenders of the literary
80. Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence,34 WM. & MARY L. REv.
741, 747-48, 757-58 (1993).
81. Id. at 762-64 (describing the incommensurability problem and the empathetic fallacy); id.
at 766 (arguing that any imposition of standards amounts to a demand that critical race theory
assimilate to the mainstream practice which it is opposing).
82. Id. at 763.
83. Once one recognizes the importance of pre-figuration to evaluation, the integrity,
conceptual security, and transcendence that conventional legal thought typically accords
to prescription, normative discourse, and evaluative criteria dissolve. Prescription, normative discourse, and evaluative criteria are just as susceptible to the practice of bias,
intolerance, authoritarianism---even cruelty, if you want-as any other kind of human
discourse.
. .. [T]his focus on evaluation will reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing a
much more serious and pervasive problem-the unraveling of the conventional paradigm, the decomposition of normative legal thought.
Pierre Schlag, Pre-figurationand Evaluation, 80 CAL.L. REv. 965, 970, 977 (1992).
84. Ansley, supra note 6, at 1511.
85. Id. at 1518.
86. "Race is and should be recognized as central to the Constitution, which is, of course
central to the law school curriculum." Id. at 1526. Ansley argues that race is a relevant topic in
all courses, id. at 1526 n.35, and discusses the importance of slavery and Native American land
claims in the development of property law, id. at 1521-26. Cf.Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the
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canon argue that the qualified pool of race-related texts is too small and that
university resources would be stretched too thin to adopt alternate canons.
By asserting that the legal "canon is already an integrated one and should be
consciously taught as such," Ansley sidesteps such maneuvering. 87 She
states that if the Constitution is granted "canonical primacy in the American
legal world, then you might [accept] the paradoxical point that the
marginalized are already at the core of our law, awaiting our recognition. 8 8
Even traditionalists must agree that race is a central issue addressed by the
Constitution, Ansley believes, and so legal scholars can then bypass the
unproductive canon debate and deal with the systemic racial questions
raised by the traditional canon.89
Ansley's article stands as a powerful model of the committed, effective
teaching that law schools aspire to foster. However, her treatment of the
legal canon and her attempt to elide the problems raised by the debate over
the literary canon are unconvincing. Ansley admits that her thesis is not
only paradoxical, but contradictory. If legal scholars in fact agreed on the
centrality of race as an element of core legal knowledge under the traditional canon, "then surely [this understanding of the canon] already would
be in place and functioning. Such is not the case." 90 Ansley then identifies
practical impediments that prevent full recognition and thematization of
race within the core curriculum, factors that are reminiscent of claims defenders of the literary canon have made.9 1 The most important factor undercutting her approach is that the significance, and even the existence, of
issues of race embedded in the traditional canon are subject to
interpretation:
If our notions of equality, liberty, due process, and federalism
were all forged in important ways in the heat of struggles over
slavery, what we make of that legacy and heritage is still open to
contest. The continued instability, even incoherence, of affirmative action doctrine is only one indication of how unsettled is national legal opinion about this central issue of race and the
Canon of ConstitutionalLaw, 68 Cm. KENT L. REv. 1087 passim (1993) (arguing that slavery
cases should form a part of the constitutional curricular canon, as reflected by extensive coverage
in casebooks and substantial assigned reading in course syllabi, but bemoaning the fact that this is
not the case).
87. Ansley, supra note 6, at 1520.
88. Id. at 1538 n.64.
89. "[E]ven across a fairly wide range of perspectives, we in legal education should be able
to agree that, in American law schools and in American legal doctrine, race is a central matter. It
is at the core of our received tradition." Id. at 1597.
90. Id. at 1586.
91. Id. at 1586-93 (describing, among other factors, the divisiveness of openly discussing
race in the classroom and the assertion of professorial autonomy by those fearful of having a
multicultural canon imposed on them).
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Constitution. Should we interpret our core constitutional values
concerning race as centering on and deriving their deepest inspiration from a historical, contextual rejection of actual and deeply
rooted white supremacy, or as creating a color-blind affirmation
of timeless, universal human equality, or as some dialectical relation between these two visions? This is not an easy question. 92
Even the apparently obvious claim that race is central to the Constitution
requires a careful reconstruction of constitutional history and an interpretive
93
recovery of this often suppressed subtext.
Ansley's attempt to bypass the canon debate falls, and she provides an
accurate diagnosis of the failure. Her strategy depends on defining the legal
canon as a collection of the key legal texts in our culture, but this strategy
ignores the sense in which the term "canon" also designates a disciplining
rule of interpretation and evaluation. Ansley's article demonstrates the futility of regarding the canon solely as a group of texts; it represents the flip
side of attempts by traditional scholars to define the canon as the entire
collection of texts having the normative force of binding law. There is no
means for avoiding the more complex issues raised when considering the
legal canon in its full sense as both a rule of interpretation and a demarcation of key legal texts.
Ansley's project is also unsuccessful on a more fundamental level.
After adopting the apparently uncontroversial assumption that all persons
would acknowledge the Constitution as a canonical text, Ansley proceeds to
demonstrate that issues of race are central to this text. Even if the canon is
regarded only as a list of central texts, it is conceivable that the Constitution
could be challenged as a canonical text precisely because it obscures the
issues of race that it purportedly resolves. 94 By claiming that "our canon"
is already integrated, Ansley reinscribes the hierarchical ideal that is the
target of the most radical challenges to the canon.95 She has not established
a vocabulary to deal with the challenges describing the Constitution as a
fundamentally flawed document-just as many literary critics have not es92. Id. at 1590. Ansley recognizes that the problem of legal interpretation is not easily demarcated and solved, but instead implicates broad questions of politics:
Both students and faculty in the legal academy will approach these matters in many
different ways. In talking with some of my colleagues who do not count themselves as
partisans in these debates, it has struck me recently that our disagreements probably rest
less on what texts we wish to include on our reading lists, or even on our vision of the
university, than on our understanding of the larger society in which we live.
Id. at 1596.
93. Id. at 1542-46.
94. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. Rnv. 4, 36-38 (1983)
(rejecting the antebellum Garrisonian "move toward nomian insularity" that regarded the Constitution as an inherently racist, and therefore illegitimate, text).
95. Ansley, supra note 6, at 1520 (emphasis added).
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tablished a vocabulary to deal with challenges that reject the Bible and
Shakespeare as irredeemably sexist texts which hold no significance for the
present, except as historical curiosities. Ansley's themes about race and the
core curriculum are important, but to justify her claims, it is necessary to
develop a more sophisticated understanding of the legal canon.
Cass Sunstein provocatively offers to defend (canonical) liberal education within law schools, but he carefully attempts to distinguish his approach from traditional arguments supporting the curricular canon.9 6 He
suggests that one can avoid the Either/Or discourse shared by traditionalists
and postmodernists alike by reinvigorating and implementing the guiding
ideal of liberal education: imparting "deep and wide understanding-to
counteract ignorance, bias, and parochialism. '9 7 Unfortunately, his sketch
degenerates all too quickly into a rather conventional viewpoint. "It doesn't
matter much whether Kant and Milton got into the canon partly for some
bad reasons; they belong. At the same time, there are undoubted biases in
existing canons and we should be alert to this fact." 98 Sunstein replaces the
timeless essence of the traditional canon with contemporary informed
choice as to which works properly measure up to the standards of greatness.
This choice is curtailed in connection with the self-defining legal canon,
since "there are certain things that law students need to learn" given that
law professors "have courts and employers to answer to." 99 Sunstein comes
as close to defending the traditional legal canon as contemporary jurisprudential discourse would seem to permit.
In contrast to the explicit discussions of the curricular canon by Ansley
and Sunstein, Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin only allude to the problem
of the legal canon in their recent provocative essay comparing legal practice
and musical performance. 10 0 Nevertheless, their article provides significant
insight into how the debate over the legal canon might translate to the practice of law generally. In the article, Levinson and Balkin review a collection of essays debating the merits of the authentic performance movement
as a methodology of musical interpretation.' 01 The authentic performance
movement is characterized by a desire to recreate scrupulously the instruments and performance practices of the era in which the music was composed, thereby presenting the modem audience with a Beethoven symphony
in precisely the manner that Beethoven's contemporaries would have heard
it and, presumably, exactly as Beethoven intended the symphony to be
96. Sunstein, supra note 15.
97. Id. at 25. Needless to say, every person on either side of the canon debate would subscribe to this goal.
98. Id. at 24.
99. Id. at 25.
100. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 2.
101. Aurnmancrr, AND EARLY Music (Nicholas Kenyon ed., 1988).
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heard.'
Levinson and Balkin draw the obvious analogy to originalist jurisprudence and argue that recovering the original pristine character of the

text or the symphony is a hopeless endeavor.

3

Their article is important to

the canon debate, however, because they describe the underlying modernist
anxiety that produces the recent turn to authenticity.'1 4
Levinson and Balkin define the culture of modernity as a period of
accelerating change and increasing rupture that rend society from tradition,
setting the stage for "those who, dismayed by present practice, preach return to the purity of the past."' 5 The authentic performance movement is

modernist because the reaction of seeking authenticity in the, past would
never occur to a participating member of a living tradition: In a return to the
past, the adherent of authenticity signals the cultural divide that has been
erected between past and current practices. 0 6 Levinson and Balkin contend
that Oliver Wendell Holmes represents the unabashed modernist attitude of
suspicion and aloof regard for the past rather than reverent preservation;
Holmes thus exhibits within legal culture the same historicist cultural disposition that underlies the authentic performance movement.10 7 Levinson and
Balkin accurately note that modernity has resulted in the fragmentation of
102. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 2, at 1601.
103. Id. at 1608-09 (outlining their thesis that law, like music, involves the performance of a
traditionary text). The authors sardonically note that the emphasis
on recreating the actual conditions of performance, finally, leads one to ask whether
recordings proclaiming such "authenticity" should not include coughs, wheezing, and
other sounds that were undoubtedly heard in Viennese drawing rooms and concert halls
during the playing of the music. At some point one crosses the line that separates scrupulousness from absurdity, but unfortunately one's confidence in the ability to locate
that line has been seriously undermined by [the authentic performance movement].
The idea that if we wish to recapture the "authentic" experience of Bach or
Beethoven all that is necessary is to pop [an authentic performance recording] into our
car stereo as we speed down interstate 35 seems increasingly preposterous the more that
one thinks about it.
Id. at 1620-22.
104. Id. at 1627-46.
105. Id. at 1628.
106. Levinson and Balkin argue that authenticity is paradoxical because it is symptomatic of a
cultural milieu in which the past is alienated from present concerns:
The more one self-consciously tries to be authentic to a tradition, the less authentic
one's practice becomes; conversely, true authenticity always emerges where one least
expects it, and indeed, it emerges virtually without any effort on the part of the actors
who are enmeshed in authentic practices.
...The unease of modernism, where "all that is solid melts into air," produces the
emotional search for resonance, tranquility, solidity, and stability.
And yet the problem of modernity is precisely the self-consciousness that we have
become partly alienated from the past.
Id. at 1632, 1637.
107. Id. at 1647-50.

1994]

AFTER DECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL CANON

1007

legal scholarship into separate canons and the deconstruction of the ideal
that there is a univocal form of legal reasoning common to all good legal
practice and scholarship.' °8 They imply that the canon debate might be yet
another manifestation of the culture of modernity.
Levinson and Balkin equate musical scores with legal texts to the extent that both are created to be performed in the future. 9hey describe their
inquiry as an effort "to figure out how one meaningfully inhabits a practice
of performance after innocence has been lost" in the modem era.' 0 9 The
legal canon is not problematic for a community immersed in the ongoing
performances that both alter and continue the legal tradition. The canon
debate is possible only when legal scholars stand apart from legal tradition
and adopt what amounts to a critical historicist attitude: legal texts are extricated from present day performances and interred in a past era. This is not
just the conscious project of critics of the canon; it is the underlying attitude
that motivates defenders of the canon to attempt resuscitation of the fading
truth of tradition. Levinson and Balkin conclude their article by praising
the second Justice Harlan's virtuoso performances as a Supreme Court Justice who animated a living tradition, even as they remind the reader that
performance is becoming increasingly difficult today as a result of historicist attitudes that distance lawyers and scholars from the past." 0
Levinson and Balkin provide an excellent diagnosis of the pathology
underlying the canon debate, but they fail to write the prescription that
might avoid the unhelpful features of the debate. They remain silent as to
how performance is possible if innocence has indeed been lost, and they
describe the nascent postmodem ethos as a quiescent acceptance of our
alienation from traditional cultural symbols. 1' Postmodern theory easily
slides into embracing a multicultural pluralism in which different genres of
legal thought and action make use of the conflicting relics of the past for
their own purposes, without any anxiety about the rupture with the past or
the incommensurability of the different genres. It is a world in which the
legal canon becomes a "fiction.""' 2
Even in its initial stages, the debate over the legal canon raises the
same grand Either/Or that motivates the debate over the literary canon.
Either legal scholarship, education, and lawyering practice are grounded in
a shared collection of texts that embody universal, if not eternal, themes
susceptible to consistent interpretation, or each practice mirrors an increasingly fragmented social system that embodies an irreducible pluralism. The
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1652-53.
at 1658.
at 1654-56.
at 1639.
at 1653.
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stage is set for the triumph of the pluralist critics and the substitution of
multiculturalist dogma for canonical dogma, but this triumph will be a
hollow victory within the present format of the debate. It is beside the point
to defend the traditional idea of the canon against these critics, but it is

crucial to explore how both sides in the debate misunderstand the issues at
stake. The terms of the debate must be shifted away from the traditionally
stated problem of the canon. This requires that the function of a canon be
reexamined.

1H.

RETHINKING THE FUNCTION OF A CANON

Literary theorists have struggled to move the canon debate to a more
productive plane. Most theorists agree that the canon is not merely a transient effect of habitual choices motivated by present-day concerns-an unstable cultural expression that inevitably is dissolving into radical cultural
pluralism with the breakdown of homogenizing social structures.11 3 Frank
Kermode emphasizes that canons are not consciously adopted or abandoned, since they reflect a cultural self-definition that enables choice in the
first place.' 4 But it is equally obvious that the canon is not a free-standing
cultural code which must be preserved and faithfully transmitted. Recent
scholarship has attempted to restructure the debate over the literary canon
by acknowledging the important cognitive function served by certain canonical texts. From this perspective, multicultural themes do not under113. Using imagery that lends itself well to legal education, the poet R.T. Smith contends that
most teachers are well aware of the rhetorical excesses of the canon debate:
To the teacher, perhaps the existence of these controversies should provide more optimism than frustration .... After all, our role now seems to be not so much curatorial as
distributive.
The two extremes under consideration in the canon scrimmage among vested interests, power-thirsty theorists, and the confused are equally execrable. On the one hand,
we have those who believe that the goal of education is the perpetuation of a code which
can be learned exclusive of any contact with application or question of immediate relevance.... At the other end of the scale lies a system of education-as-skills aimed at
coping, education reduced to training, with the assumption that the well-trained individual will always be able to spin the straw of practical and concrete experience to gold, If
either camp ever vanquishes the other, heaven help us, but I don't worry very much
about that possibility for there are too many educators ... who want less to pin information into a collection than to study it in motion .... They are not people who worship
texts with the coroner's cold eye, but people who prefer dialogue, even dissent, to reverence ....
"A body of knowledge" is what poor teachers "cover" in class like a cadaver on a
slab, but a force is altogether different.
Smith, supra note 52, at 27-29.
114. KERmODE, PoEmy, supra note 9, at 76 ("You can't suddenly say, let's have a new canon.
That's not the way canons work.... That's not the way canons are formed. That's not the way
they're broken.").
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mine the "nation-building functions of education" once we accept the
cognitive insight that knowledge is "fluid, dynamic, dialectical, evolving
and temporal,""' 5 and recognize that the canon can foster learning through
its flexibility.
A canon so conceived would be a living document, more protean
than concrete, designed not so much to protect and conserve
knowledge and technique as to enable learning and the development of intellect.
... [Elducators are beginning to realize that the teaching of
dogma (either hegemonic or resistant) is no longer appropriate for
the optimal development of learners. It is to teaching for the development of competence in critical analysis, critical interpretation, and critical understanding that modem pedagogy has turned.
In the final analysis, the integrity of the academic canon may
have to be judged by the extent it enables such teaching and
116
learning.
Articulating this idea of a nation-building, yet dialectically fluid canon has
interested several scholars tired of the canon debate.
George Allan provides a useful example of this approach by drawing
on Alfred North Whitehead's effort to elevate "process" to central importance without surrendering existence and knowledge to "a maelstrom of
ontological fluidity.""' 7 Whitehead argues that the flux of existence inevitably reveals patterns that provide a temporarily stable realm within which
practical reason operates. The forms of life girded by practical reason inevitably are challenged by the full weight of reality, which is not entirely
ordered by practical reason. As pressure intensifies, speculative reason critiques and moves beyond the temporary stability of a given practical order
and establishes a new temporary resolution. Allan argues that Whitehead's
philosophy provides insight for the canon debate by establishing a "middle
and phyrrhonic relativism, between an abway between dogmatic essences
118
solute canon and none at all."

The hurly-burly formlessness of a canonless curriculum where
anything goes is diffuse and therefore barren. A canon-in-process
is one requiring the sort of creative interdependency that is educationally fruitful.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Gordon & Bhattacharyya, supra note 48, at 416, 412.
Id.at 414, 417.
Allan, supra note 10, at 5.
Id.at 8.
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Canons of acceptability are needed ....
[but] such canons
must be constantly challenged by tracing the losses accompanying each gain ....
An educational canon is a perch, a place to which a community comes. It sums up a struggle to bring something stable out of
the noise and bustle of a prior contentiousness... [, it] allows a
community to orient itself within the world, to take stock of its
purposes, its ways of doing things, to get a grip on what it thinks
important[, but] eventually the perch will no longer suffice, and
it will be time to take flight again into some new cacophony of
social disputation, seeking a new vantage point from which to
order things.' 19
Allan gives an accurate overview of the canon as a canon-in-process-a
force that is beyond the political assertions which both sides of the canon
debate appear to emphasize. Yet Allan does not provide a description of
how this canon-in-process provides contemporary readers with the provocation and the resources to contribute to, and benefit from, the social process
of canon-building. The literary critic, Charles Altieri, offers just this detail
in defending the idea of a canon from both its supporters and its critics.
Because Altieri's description of the cognitive function of the canon serves
as the basis for developing a framework for approaching the legal canon, it
merits detailed explanation.
Altieri wants to preserve the ennobling function of the canon to establish the rhetorical space in which an idealized community is posited, tested,
and revised. The ascendancy of critical historicist scholarship troubles Altieri not because it rejects the idea of a canon, but because it disempowers
the canon by distancing the reader from its force. Altieri opposes the critical historicist tenet that current conflict between competing self-interests is
assisted by assiduously demystifying the past to eliminate its ideological
119. Id. at 7, 8. John Dewey draws the same analogy in the course of his discussion of the
interrelationship of aesthetic creation and aesthetic appreciation, but he does so in a manner that
more clearly states the cognitive significance that this Article shall attach to the process:
William James aptly compared the course of a conscious experience to the alternate
flights and perchings of a bird. The flights and perchings are intimately connected with
one another;, they are not so many unrelated lightings succeeded by a number of equally
unrelated happenings. Each resting place in experience is an undergoing in which is
absorbed and taken home the consequences of prior doing, and, unless the doing is that
of utter caprice or sheer routine, each doing carries in itself meaning that has been
extracted and conserved. As with the advance of an army, all gains from what has been
already effected are periodically consolidated, and always with a view to what is to be
done next. If we move too rapidly, we get away from the base of supplies-of accrued
meanings-and the experience is flustered, thin and confused. If we dawdle too long
after having extracted a net value, experience perishes of inanition.
JOHN DEWEy, ART AS ExPEum~cE 56 (Capricorn Books 1958) (1934).
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hold. Instead, he describes the necessary positive resource that is provided
by a living canon.
I want to argue that the past that canons preserve is best understood as an enduring theater helping us to shape and judge personal and social values, that our self-interest in the present
consists primarily in establishing ways of employing that theater
to gain distance from ideological commitments, and that the most
plausible hope for the influence of literary study in the future lies
to transmit the past as a set of challenges and
in our ability
120
models.
[With a vital canon,] the past becomes a provocation rather
than a trap. It provides intensities that challenge our contemporary habits; it demands that we measure ourselves against the
processes of questioning, projecting identifications, and struggling with precursors that we find in the relations among authors
preserved by the canon; and it affords specific imaginative configurations that often show us what is at stake in the most radical
contemporary experiments, in psychology as well as in art.12 '
[I will] demonstrate the value of opposing the historicist,
deconstructive model of reading against texts with a model that
emphasizes reading through texts in order to adapt their purposive
intelligence to contemporary concerns.' 2 2
The narrow analytical contribution of critical historicist scholarship overas an imaginative backdrop, plays in
shadows the vital role that the canon,
1 23
worlds.
possible
of
projection
the
Although crafted as a response to critical historicism, Altieri's recent
work offers strong affirmative support for the value of the canon despite the
120. ALrIm, supra note 9, at 24.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 16. Altieri explicitly contrasts the negative and empty stance of critical historicism
with his positive account of literature.
Superb at describing how political conditions impose themselves on writers, the new
demystifiers prove much less able to show how literature provides means for responding
creatively to those conditions.
Here, then, is the most important stake in the current controversy: not whether there
is some exclusionary dogma (the canon stopped having that kind of authority a long
time ago), but what languages we will have for talking about human actions and what
selves that vocabulary will encourage our pursuing.
Id. at 4, 78-79.
123. Id. at 47. Altieri states that "it is a mistake to read cultural history only as a tawdry
melodrama of interests pursued and ideologies produced," but his emphasis seems to be on the
word "only." Id. at 21. Altieri readily agrees that literary criticism should expose the delusions of
overly "reverential stances." Id. at 6.
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obvious inadequacies of traditional defenses. 1" The canon is not the repos-

itory for core human values that traditional defenders have posited, but it
does represent the site where individual commitments are relaxed suffi-

ciently to permit negotiation of the bonds of community in a world defined
by radical othemess. To some degree, Altieri accepts the postmodern account of contemporary social life; however, he argues that the irreducible

differences among members of a community do not forestall, but rather
necessitate, the operation of a canon.'25 In a provocative chapter, Altieri
posits that John Rawls can teach Jean-Francois Lyotard a thing or two about
postmodern politics because Rawls begins by accepting the existence of
irreconcilable differences that can be mediated, although never entirely,
only in the idealized political drama occasioned by Rawls's use of a hy126
pothesized veil of ignorance.
124. Altieri summarizes his revision of the traditional claims for the function of a canon as
follows:
[Curatorial regard for a high canon institutionalizes idealization as a force shaping our
sense of what communities we wish to identify with and what selves to pursue; the
normative force of that canon challenges individuals and new movements within the arts
to meet certain communal criteria for self-representation; and the canon's imaginative
scope helps focus discussions about the ends of politics that are very difficult to develop
if one's major interests lie in demystifying prevailing beliefs and resisting all cultural
positivities.
Id. at 50.
125. [We] must supplement poststructural theory by showing how singular agents become articulate and responsible members of communities by accepting certain principles of judgment and by learning to negotiate competing interests . . . we can find
considerable incentives to seek within history-the only ground we have-images and
principles clarifying those powers individual agents have for reconciling the singular
and the collective.
Id. at 222-23.
126. Id. at 255-89 ("Chapter Nine-Judgment and Justice Under Postmodern Conditions: Or
How Lyotard Helps Us Read Rawls as a Postmodern Thinker"). Altieri accepts that Rawls's
project is irredeemably flawed as a liberal effort to escape the politics of interest, but argues, from
a postmodern reading, that Rawls accurately describes the crucial gesture of postmodem politics.
Perhaps it is an unnecessary feature of Rawls's model to insist on a Kantian suspension
of all interests when we assume the veil of ignorance. Perhaps the important thing is
how even making the gesture demonstrates that we can suspend some interests and can
for argument's sake understand interests that are not our own. And perhaps it is precisely because we cannot fully distance ourselves from our own interests that the veil of
ignorance proves so important, for it requires our casting the effort to suspend interests
in a way that exposes to clear view what we in fact fail to suspend .... In fact, it is
because self-interests lead individuals to distort the veil of ignorance that we need the
kind of dramatic method that may make those distortions visible and negotiable.
Id. at 280-81. Rawls's importance lies in his recognition that "the diversity of language games
opens up the possibility that agents can participate in a shared rhetorical theater for making and
testing binding claims about justice." Id. at 285; cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLrICAL LIBERALIsM 27
(1993). Rawls argues that when we
simulate being in the original position, our reasoning no more commits us to a particular
metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our acting a part in a play, say of
Macbeth or Lady Macbeth, commits us to thinking that we are really a king or a queen
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How does Altieri propose that the literary canon can assist with such

fundamentally important political activity? Altieri urges us to relinquish
the narrow egocentric designs that contemporary interpreters bring to texts
by accepting, only provisionally, the authority of canonical texts by reading
through them rather than againstthem. 127 Readers should not purport to sit
in removed judgment of the canon, because judgments are made possible
only by virtue of the canon. A canonical text is not a command from the

past as much as a convincing exemplar of how we can move beyond individual interests by fashioning idealized forms of community.
There is almost no danger of identification solely with [the canon's] terms because there is such historical distance and because
there is so much contradiction within the canon that it serves

more as grammar than as code of values, more as an example of
possible intensities and modes of self-representation than as vehicle imposing a particular model of behavior.' 28
The dramatic space of the canon fosters an intersubjective representation of
idealized selves through a shared language and thus discounts the supposed
radical heterogeneity of postmodernism without positing a homogenous
cultural code. 2 9 Altieri emphasizes that this grammar speaks in the rich
engaged in a desperate struggle for political power. Much the same holds for role playing generally.
Id.
127. Altieri, supra note 9, at 21, 45, 55-56.
128. Id. at 76.
129. Id. at 191, 223. Altieri demonstrates his thesis in his discussions of Plato, Wordsworth,
and Joyce in Part Two: CanonicalExemplars and ContemporaryValues. Id. at 109-88; see also
CHARLES ALTmRI, PAiNTERLY ABSTRACTION IN MODERNIST POETRY: THE_ CoNTEMPORANEiTY OF

8 (1989) (resisting new historicist readings of Modernist poetry by concentrating "on
how the stances that the artists elaborate have plausible claims on our contemporary values").
I read Altieri's description of the canonical theater of dramatic projection quite literally. My
three-year-old daughter, Catherine, provides a daily reminder to me of the power and importance
of dramatic projection for learning how to be a social being in the particular culture in which one
is born. Adults commonly discount this activity as a "stage" in development typified by "overactive" imagination, but by truncating this mode of being and knowing we in fact impair our ability
to learn. Altieri seems correct in identifying the act of reading literature as one example of this
decentering way of knowing that at least some adults regularly experience. Under the pressures of
Enlightenment rationalism, adults by and large restrict their definition of knowledge to the learning that occurs in what William Poteat has called the "theater of solitude," namely conscious
reflection. See William Poteat, For Whom is the Real Existence of Values a Problem: Or, An
Attempt to Show that the Obvious is Plausible, reprinted in MIND, VALUE AND CULTURE: ESSAYS
INHONOR OF E. M. ADAms 147, 154 (David Weissbord ed., 1989).
Calvin Schrag recently has argued against the radical particularity evident in the new historicism of postmodern theory from a philosophical, rather than strictly literary, perspective. He does
so in a manner that sounds many of Altieri's themes. CALvIN 0. ScHRAG, THm RESOURCES OF
RATioNALrrY: A RESPONSE TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE (1992). The postmodern attack on
ahistorical conceptions of reason, Schrag contends, does not undermine the activity of reasoning
within a tradition-bound context. Schrag embraces the idea of a "communicative rationality that
offers its own resources of critique, articulation, and disclosure, no longer requiring the epistemoMODERNISM
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overlapping configurations of first-, second-, and third-person representa-

30
tions that link expression, intimacy, and public projection.'
Radical feminist criticism represents one prominent threat to the intersubjective space of the canon, Altieri contends, by composing an alternate
canon of "woman as victim.., whose primary traits involve withdrawal
from all public space."' 131 Feminist historian Elizabeth Fox-Genovese artic-

ulates this concern more carefully, astutely noting that the necessity of
broadening the traditional (male-constructed) canon arises for the very reason that postmodern feminists' efforts to destroy the canon are problematic. 132 Women have been denied a role in public life in part, she argues,

through the power of the canon to deny women a role in the idealized
drama of community-building. 3 3 Destroying the canon, therefore, exacerbates the historical denial of public participation by women.

One of the main functions of the canon has been to provide a
bridge between the personal role [of subjectivity] and public
identity [expressed as collective goals and norms]. . . The
claims of feminism are just and practical, but the exaggeration of
those claims threatens to undermine the canon, and to replace any
notion of the public self with capitulation to the private .... [I]f
the canon faces a bleak and arid future without feminism, femithe context that only a reinvigonism faces trivialization 1without
34
rated canon can provide.
Altieri similarly argues that the feminist preoccupation with oppression cannot be effective without invoking the rich terms the canon provides "for
logical guarantees of universality and necessity issuing from a vertical grounding." Id. at 165. By
stressing hermeneutical understanding, narration, and rhetoric as constitutive features of communicative rationality, Schrag argues that the ongoing social drama of reaching tentative agreements
about political-ethical issues operates at the level of intersubjective relations and can never be
reduced to a pure, particularized desire on the part of an individual. Id.
130. ALTmRi, supra note 9, at 291-317 ("Chapter Ten-Life After Difference: The Positions
of the Interpreter and the Positionings of the Interpreted"). Altieri is using the term "grammar" in
a broad sense, distinguishing his approach from the more narrow construction of grammar by
those who note the importance of canonical literature to establish and reinforce "the King's English," or, more recently, "Standard English," as the mode of speaking correctly. GuILLORY, supra
note 8, at 241-43.
131. ALTmri, supra note 9, at 65.
132. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Feminist Challenge to the Canon, NAT'L FORUM: PHI
KAPPA PHI J., Summer 1989, at 32, 32 [hereinafter Fox-Genovese, Feminist Challenge]; see also
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Claims of a Common Culture: Gender,Race, Class and the Canon,
72 SALMAGUNDI 131, 141-42 (1986) (arguing that the canon must be enlarged to include those
who traditionally were "excluded from membership in the republic of letters").
133. Fox-Genovese persuasively claims that even oppressed men within Western society can
identify with the universal claims of the traditional canon in a manner that women at all levels of
society could never hope to do. Fox-Genovese, Feminist Challenge, supra note 132, at 34.
134. Id. at 34.
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describing the full dynamics of oppression, as well as what becomes avail135
able as we manage to overcome that dynamics."'
Altieri grounds his description of the cognitive significance of the canon in Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgment, which responds to the problem of linking the universal grammar of the third-person to the concrete
concerns expressed in the first-person. Just as Kant expunged aesthetic
judgment from his account of theoretical reason in which the particular is
subordinated to the universal, Altieri describes the development of ethical
judgment as a response to the normative force of canonical exemplars that
is not subsumed under the specific historical values which these texts represent.' 3 6 Kant's approach problematizes a universal, rationally based ethics
because "the very claim of rational universality gives us no way to understand how empirical agents can possibly see the ethical life as continuous
with their concrete situations and commitments."' 137 By regarding ethical
action as an expressive performance carried out without recourse to
self-grounding, rigid, and universal principles, Altieri hopes
to bring the account of the ethical subject closer to Kant's description of aesthetic judgment. For while our ethics then loses
the authority of rationality, we gain more pragmatic criteria for
ethical behavior that still can be sharply opposed to simple

preferences. 138
The canon is the projective field that ethical agents enter in crafting a practical rationality that girds social life, even in the increasingly fragmented
cultures of the late-capitalist democracies.
The off-putting and apparently abstract jargon Altieri employs should
not obscure what is a very pragmatic account of reading literature that
deeply resonates with common sense. The reading of literary masterpieces
commonly is encouraged for its cathartic value. Catharsis often is viewed
as a kind of subjective reaction, deeply personal and idiosyncratic, although
it generally plays out in similar ways among members of a culture. Altieri
refines these intuitions by emphasizing the intersubjective dramatic world
that the reader enters when experiencing catharsis. The literary text provides exemplars of a range of attitudes, emotions, and attachments that the
reader adopts in the act of reading-literally by playing out these potentialities. 139 This experience of reading is not defined by a pure or abstract aesthetic response, but by a participation in a public realm of values that is
much wider than the reader's horizon. The reader might be horrified or
135. ALTmRi, supra note 9, at 65.
136. Id. at 248; see also supra note 31.
137. ATmPi, supra note 9, at 225.
138. Id. at 227.
139. For example, more than a few adults likely will recall vividly the adolescent dramatic
performance played out in their reading of William Golding's Lord of the Flies.
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ennobled by the various roles he adopts during reading, and these second-order critical responses to the drama also thrust the reader into the
sphere of publically redeemed ethical knowledge.
At this point, it is helpful to express Altieri's approach in terms of the
two senses of the word "canon." The canon does not provide a universal
rule of evaluation that determines in advance which texts are meritorious,
but instead constitutes a bounded cultural arena within which an evolving
process of case-by-case judgment occurs. The canon does not constitute a
list of timeless masterpieces that we occasionally supplement, but rather a
shifting repertoire of normative exemplars that wd find necessary to the
ongoing maintenance of public life. Altieri redefines the canon-both as a
rule of evaluation and a collection of texts-in a manner that responds to
the anti-foundationalist themes of postmodern thought. He also attends to
the concrete contexts that define persons as individuals and members of a
community.' 4 0 And yet, Altieri's identification of the dramatic function of
the canon does not hold at bay the critic's charge that contemporary social
pressures demand and require experimental theater crafted by new playwrights. A sophisticated understanding of the function of the canon does
not avoid the contentious political battles of the canon debate, and in fact
may only raise the stakes. Before discussing the legal canon, it is necessary
to explore why members of a community read through certain texts in the
manner Altieri describes, but do not read through other available texts in the
same way. This question leads to an inquiry into the power of the classic.

IV. THE POWER
A.

OF CLASSICAL

TExTS

The Nature of a Classic

The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer has spent much of his
long and prolific career explaining how understanding occurs, developing
what he terms a "philosophical hermeneutics."''l At the crucial juncture of
his philosophical magnum opus, Gadamer explores our continuing fascina140. Altieri properly notes that the deconstructive decentering of the subject cannot and does
not eradicate the subject so much as highlight the interaction between self and other.
Subjectivity is inseparable from intersubjectivity, less because the subject must be socially constituted than because the field of its actions takes on significant force only in
and through the parameters brought to bear by the ear of the other.
." [W]e need not be as wary of all categorization as [Jacques] Derrida and
[Roland] Barthes are, just as we need not reject the significance of self-reflection even
though that process cannot be self-grounding.
ALTmr, supra note 9, at 215, 221-22.

141.

Gadamer's principal works include GADAmER, supra note 31; PHIMosoPHIcAL HiRm-E

rNtrncs (David E. Linge trans. and ed., 1976) [hereinafter GADAMER, PHILosoPHIcAL HERmENEUTics]; and DALOGUE AND DLALEcnic: EIGHT HERMENEUTIcAL STUDIES ON PLATO (P. Christopher
Smith trans., 1980) [hereinafter GADAmER, DIALOGUE].
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tion with the classical texts of antiquity as sources of truth.' 42 Gadamer
anticipates the contemporary canon debate by some twenty years, but his
discussion of the force of the classical provides an excellent supplement to
Altieri's recent efforts to redefine the function of the literary canon. Altieri
focuses exclusively on the public projection the canon affords without critically assessing whether it is accurate to suppose that we choose the vehicles
of our projection. Gadamer explains that the classics choose us before we
choose them, and that this circumstance defines the essence of their classical status. Gadamer's approach is quite compatible with Altieri's.
Gadamer stresses that our situation of understanding involves a dramatic
performance that fuses the world of the classical and that of the reader, but
Gadamer's philosophical investigations place Altieri's insights in
143
perspective.
Joel Weinsheimer, a literary critic and Gadamer scholar, argues that
adopting Gadamer's terminology of the classical immediately challenges
traditional views of the canon.'14 Weinsheimer points out that "canon" is a
collective noun which represents a body of works, and therefore is "plural
but determinate."' 145 In contrast, "classic" is a singular noun that can be
pluralized, and therefore is "singular but indeterminate." 146 This difference

manifests itself in our presumption that there is a process of canonization
142. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 277-307 ("Tart II, ch. II(b): Prejudices as Conditions of
Understanding"). This Article continues and refines my larger project of describing the ontology
of legal understanding, drawing primarily from Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. See Francis J. Mootz II, The New Legal Hermeneutics, 47 VA'D. L. REv. 115 passim (1994); Mootz,
supra note 62 passim; Mootz, supra note 3 passim; Francis J. Mootz 1I, Is the Rule of Law
Possible in a Postmodern World? 68 WASH. L. REv. 249, 253 (1993); Francis J. Mootz I, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration That the Obvious is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. Rv. (1993). My criticism of the canon debate reinforces my general theme that critique is a feature of
a given practice rather than a privileged perspective on that practice. I do not doubt that many
aspects of the "critique of the legal canon" will be healthy for legal practice, teaching and scholarship, but this Article argues that critics must abandon naive ontological assumptions about the
power of critique. In future articles, I shall move forward from my ontological account to sketch
my vision of legal critique.
143. Altieri refers to Gadamer's work only in passing, and always in negative terms. ALTmu,
supra note 9, at 46, 81, 104. In each instance he mischaracterizes Gadamer's position. As expressed in the text accompanying this note, to the extent that Altieri and Gadamer diverge,
Gadamer puts Altieri in proper perspective. Of course, Altieri's work informs my reading of
Gadamer's work, and so it undoubtedly is incorrect to superordinate Gadamer as if his efforts
represent an unimpeachable standard against which other thinkers must be measured. Instead, I
claim only that after the confrontation between Gadamer and Altieri, Gadamer's work is the better
vehicle for exploring the increased understanding occasioned by the confrontation.
144. WmENsHEnER, supra note 1, at 129-35 ("The Classical as Challenge to the Canonical");
see also Fred Dallmayr, Self and Other: Gadamerand the Hermeneutics of Difference, 5 YALE
J.L. & HumAN. 507, 527 (1993) (suggesting that Gadamer's philosophy provides important insight into the canon debate).
145. WEiNsHEmER, supra note 1, at 130.
146. Id. at 131.
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which confers canonical status, but that the classic is defined by some "inherent quality, worth, [or] value" which is beyond the conscious choices
made within an interpretive community. 4 7 It is not flip or nitpicking to
suggest that Gadamer would ridicule efforts to defend the canon as it traditionally is defined, but that he also would argue vehemently that the experience of reading classical texts reveals how understanding occurs. One can
rework the conundrums of the canon debate by following Gadamer's exposition of the important status of classical texts.
Gadamer's philosophical project represents a sustained effort to overcome the grand Either/Or that animates a significant portion of modem philosophy, as well as the canon debate. The modem philosophical era largely
is defined by oscillations between the ideologies of Enlightenment and Romanticism, which involve a contest between the assertions of secular, critical reason and the claims of the ineffable myths of tradition. 4 ' The
Enlightenment critique of religious dogmatism was cast in terms that rejected the value of tradition in favor of ahistorical reason as the only legitimate authority. The Romantic reversal of this schema has served only to
perpetuate the same wrongheaded and "abstract contrast between myth and
reason."' 14 9 This centuries-old dynamic has sharpened in the "swiftly
changing age" of the current century: historical discontinuities are "exaggerated because they forget what persists unseen," provoking the reactive
invocation of "the eternal orders of nature and appealing to human nature to
legitimize the idea of natural law."'150 Gadamer rejects this polarization and
argues that thinking within tradition is rational, even though it occurs
outside the presumed ahistorical and empirical domain of the sciences.' 5 1
At a very general level, then, Gadamer questions the critic's effort to adopt
a rigorously critical perspective of the tradition that is bequeathed to and
animates him.
Gadamer's project speaks directly to the central issues raised in the
canon debate. He endeavors to rehabilitate the authority of tradition without hypostatizing essential human nature or invariable values. Tradition
embodies authority, Gadamer argues, not because it locks us in a coercive
ideological vise or because we choose to follow its dictates, but because we

147. Id.
148. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 273.

149. Id.
150. Id. at xxiv.
151. Gadamer's project bears a strong resemblance to the description of the traditions of ethical reasoning expressed in ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? passim
(1988). For a Gadamerian critique of Maclntyre's approach, however, see P. CHRISTOPHER
SMrrH, HERMENEurics AND HUMAN FINITUDE passim (1991).
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acknowledge its force in the way we conduct our lives. 152 'True authority
does not have to be authoritarian," he declares, because authority also is
constituted in the ego-decentering, unforced acknowledgment that "the
other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight." 5 3 Gadamer would
regard the attempt to deconstruct the literary canon in its entirety as an
amusing, hubristic attempt to stand outside the authority of tradition in the
spirit of Enlightenment critique, but he also would regard the effort to defend the canon, represented as a determinate cultural artifact, as equally
misguided. The authority-or truth-of tradition derives from its continuing critical appropriation, in which we distinguish the "legitimate
understanding from the unproductive
prejudices" of tradition that enable 54
prejudices that warp understanding.'
Gadamer regards classical texts as embodiments of the authority of
tradition. This simple statement is problematic because it raises the full
breadth of issues in the canon debate, and thus merits a careful explication.1 55 The authority of tradition is not a self-contained power that is transmitted through a textual vessel and then passively absorbed by the reader;
instead, the authority of tradition is reconstituted with each reading of the
1 56
text.
We are likely to think of "tradition" as what lies merely behind us
or as what we take over more or less automatically. On the contrary, for Gadamer "tradition" or "what is handed down from the
past" confronts us as a task, as an effort of understanding we feel
ourselves required to make because we recognize our limitations,
even though no one compels us to do so. It precludes complacency, passivity, and self-satisfaction with what we securely pos57
sess; instead it requires active questioning and self-questioning.1
Readers always approach the classical text with a fore-structure of understanding that motivates their encounter with the text, but the classical text
can "break the spell of our own fore-meanings" (without ever eliminating
them) by pulling us up short and initiating further questioning and under-

ch. II(b)(i): The Rehabilitation of Author152. GADANMR, supra note 31, at 277-85 ('Tart II,
ity and Tradition").
153. Id. at 280 n.206, 279.
154. Id. at 277, 298-99.
155. Gadamer begins his discussion of the classical by noting that it "requires hermeneutical
reflection of some sophistication to discover how it is possible for a normative concept such as the
classical to acquire or regain its scholarly legitimacy." Id. at 285-86.
156. Id. at xxxvii (arguing that his critics fail to recognize that he never equates understanding
with the naive appropriation of "customary opinions" or "what tradition has sanctified").
157. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, Preface to GADAmER, TRuTH AND METHOD,
supra note 31, at xi, xvi.
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standing. 158 The power of the classic resides in its exemplary ability to
question the reader's horizon of experience and draw the reader into an
event of understanding. Although there is always a "multiplicity of what
can be thought" about a text, Gadamer stresses that "not everything is possible" if the classical text is permitted to "present itself in all its otherness and
thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings."' 15 9
Translation-the conversion of something foreign into something
meaningful-provides the model for all textual understanding, inasmuch as
this activity reveals clearly the interplay of text and reader that lies behind
every appropriation of written meaning. Gadamer contends that we should
embrace our status as translators of traditionary texts, a status that never
amounts to mere repetition but instead allows the text to prove itself in its
own significance. Translation
allows the foreign to become one's own, not by destroying it critically or reproducing it uncritically, but by explicating it within
one's own horizons with one's own concepts and thus giving it
new validity. Translation allows what is foreign and what is
one's own to merge in a new form by defending the point [of
view] of the other even if it be opposed to one's own view... In
this process of finite thought ever moving forward while allowing
the other to have its way60 in opposition to oneself, the power of
reason is demonstrated.1
"It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, ifwe understand
at all."' 6 The significance of classical texts is that, in a more compelling
manner than other texts, they draw contemporary readers into active dialogue in a way that facilitates the translation of tradition to the concerns of
the present.
Gadamer regards conversational dialogue as the model of understanding, including textual understanding. The classical text does submit to effortless (and therefore pseudo) translation to the concerns of the
contemporary reader; it presents a challenge to the reader. "The classic not
only submits to questioning but turns to interrogate its inquisitors-if they

158. GADAmER, supra note 31, at 268. Charles Altieri inexplicably misses this central aspect
of Gadamer's philosophy. See AL.TmaR, supra note 9, at 46, 104.
159. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 269.
160. GADAmER, PHULosopHIcAL HEmamurcs, supra note 141, at 94. Gadamer characterizes understanding as a "fusion of horizons" of text and reader, exemplified in the fusion that
occurs in translation. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 306-07, 374-75, 384-89. It is important to
emphasize, however, that Gadamer never regards this fusion as leading to a wholly coincident
union of text and reader, which is why we constantly are repaid by attending to the classics. Id. at
304, 306.
161. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 297.
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are willing to listen."16 2 Dialogue requires two parties, and Gadamer argues that the classical text serves as a dialogical partner with the reader to
the extent that, through the force of its historical trajectory, it causes the
reader to reassess her preunderstanding. The classic, then, becomes the locus of a critical reassessment by the reader.
It is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is
constantly operating unnoticed, but only when it is, so to speak,
provoked. The encounter with a traditionary text can provide this
provocation . . . . [This event] has the logical structure of a
question.
The essence of the question is to open up possibilities and
prejudice is properly
keep them open. . . . In fact our own
163
brought into play by being put at risk.
The traditionary texts that regularly provoke readers in this way become
classics.
The classical text transcends the caricatures of the canon debate. The
concept of the classical does not simply signify "a historical style," but
neither does it claim to represent "suprahistorical value."'" The classical
text is defined by a "historical process of preservation that, through con65 Acstantly proving itself, allows something true to come into being."'
cording to Gadamer, the historicist assertion that there are no unbiased
value judgments does not undermine the classic because the classic is a
thoroughly historical experience that precedes the critic's historical reflection.' 6 6 The classical text is not only a product of history, it produces the
162. WENSHEMER, supra note 1,at 129. Weinsheimer thus distinguishes a classic from a
graffito without hypothesizing eternal, formal qualities. The "difference between a graffito and a
classic is this: the graffito doesn't talk back." Id. at 128.
163. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 299. Thomas Pangle recently discussed the problem of the
canon in a manner that is quite close to Gadamer's description of classical texts as dialogic partners for contemporary readers. THOMAS L. PANOLE,THE ENNOBLING OF DEIMocRAcy: THm CHALLENGE OF THE POSTMODERN ERA 183-218 (1992) ("Chapter 10-Against Canons and Canonicity:
Dialectic as the Heart of Higher Education"). Pangle, like Gadamer, regards Plato's Socratic
dialogues as preeminent examples of learning that are embodied in the confrontation with classical
texts. Id. at 195-200; cf. GADAMER, DALOGUE, supra note 141, passim (arguing that Plato's
dialogues reveal that understanding comes not from the pristine logic of argument, but rather from
the give and take of conversation).
Pangle cautions against subjecting classical texts to the reader's egocentric concerns: "The
point is not to learn about the books; the point is to learn from them." PANGLE, supra, at 201.
Pangle argues that we read classic texts in search of a "true dialogue, in which the very meaning
and purpose of our lives is at stake. We seek critics who challenge us to the core, compelling us
to rethink our own foundations, and eliciting from us some genuine, if grudging, admiration for
the alternative they represent or pose." ld at 196. "A liberal education that is truly liberating in
the Socratic sense is an education that brings us face to face with disturbing challenges to our
deepest and apparently surest moral commitments." Id. at 195.
164. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 287.
165. Id. (parenthetical German terms omitted).
166. Id.
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historical consciousness that embraces it. The reader's fore-structure or horizon of understanding is shaped indelibly by the history of effects of the
classical texts before he takes up the task of translating the text to his

situation.
The universe of the classic comprehends everything shared and
common, everything that is intelligible without the need for explanation, everything that is assumed as apparent and indisputable, everything upon which further thought can be based ...

Everyone can be-and to some degree, in fact, always is-classically literate without having read the classics at all. The classical

legacy is a bequest the heirs cannot reject, for they have always
already inherited the classics even before having read them.1 67

The classical text appears to speak directly to the contemporary reader not
1 68

because it is timeless, but because it is a productive historical force.
"Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as partici-

167. WEiNsHEnMER, supra note 1, at 140. In response to an interviewer's question regarding
the unique power of the texts of classical antiquity, Gadamer acknowledged that the question
raised a "complicated matter," but argued that their power is probably rooted in the fact that "they
have formed our understanding, our anticipations of what makes sense so profoundly, that they
remain ultimate reference points for us." HANs-GEORG GADAMER ON EDUCATION, POETRY, AND
HIsTORY: APPLIEuD HE
tmu'rics 67 (Lawrence Schmidt & Monica Reuss trans., Dieter Misgeld
& Graeme Nicholson eds., 1992) (drawing from interviews conducted in 1985 and 1986).
Gadamer begins Truth and Method by rehabilitating key humanist terms, such as common sense
and judgment, that speak to the traditionary force that defines the historical effects of the classics.
GADAMER, supra note 31, at 5-40.
168. mhe classical epitomizes a general characteristic of historical being: preservation
amid the ruins of time.... [lit is not a statement about what is past-documentary
evidence that still needs to be interpreted-rather, it says something to the present as if
it were said specifically to it. What we call "classical" does not first require the overcoming of historical distance, for in its own constant mediation it overcomes this distance by itself. The classical, then, is certainly "timeless," but this timelessness is a
mode of historical being.
GADAMER, supra note 31, at 289-90.
This point, emphasized by Gadamer, provides a useful example of how the canon debate
often represents unproductive posturing, even in the hands of the most skilled commentators.
Barbara Hermstein Smith's highly influential argument that canonical values are historically contingent includes a rebuke of Gadamer for suggesting that classics are self-mediating. Smith, supra
note 30, at 29. She counters that the classics appear timeless and self-mediating only because they
have so thoroughly penetrated the culture enveloping the contemporary reader-precisely the
point that Gadamer is making. Id. Joel Weinsheimer later criticizes Smith from a Gadamerian
perspective, arguing that she insufficiently acknowledges that the classical produces the social
dynamism defining the canon, which is the very point that Smith is making. WEINSHEIMER, supra
note 1, at 134. The important distinction is one of emphasis: Weinsheimer regards this situation
of historicity as unavoidable and productive of knowledge, while Smith regards it as fraught with
bias hypostatized as truth. But this important exchange of views cannot take place when commentators fail to acknowledge their substantial common ground and to continue the discussion from
that shared point of reference.
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pating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission [translation] in
169
which past and present are constantly mediated."'
The classical text speaks directly to the reader as a dialogical partner,
then, because it is distanced from the reader. The classical text is not easily
put to the service of the reader's horizonal prejudices because it is removed
from the pressing concerns of the moment. Gadamer agrees that this distance often is temporal in nature-thus the platitude that classical texts have
passed the test of time-but he agrees that distance is not defined exclusively in temporal terms.' 70 Although he does not explain non-temporal
distance, it is fair conjecture to suggest that contemporary texts generated
from distant cultures could become classics within a short time by virtue of
their power to initiate dialogue that moves beyond the immediate circumstances surrounding the creation of the text. Although distance is necessary
to allow the text to speak and provoke, the critical historicist attitude that
turns distance into a yawning abyss, overcome only through the intellectual
effort of the critic, serves to silence the text. "The text that is understood
[only] historically is forced to abandon its claim to be saying something
true [i.e., something] valid and intelligible for ourselves." 17 ' The critical
historicist scholar insulates her fore-conceptions from the questioning
power of the classic and attempts to reduce the text to a historical phenomenon that makes no claim on her present situation.
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics grounds Altieri's conception of
the function of a canon. Gadamer explains that classical texts promote understanding because they shape in advance our preconceptions, but that
classical texts also challenge these preconceptions in the act of reading.
Classical texts are freed of the specific historical contingencies surrounding
their creation and appear to speak directly to the reader, and yet, the texts
provoke dialogue by remaining irreducibly distinct from the reader's particular concerns. Gadamer's ontological description of the historicity of understanding complements Altieri's phenomenology of reading literature.
Altieri demonstrates that dialogue with a classical text involves a dramatic
play in which the narrow interests of the reader are suppressed in favor of a
more general idealization of public forms of life. The compatibility of their
approaches is underscored by each author's efforts to appropriate Kant's
of aesthetic judgment by regrudging concession of the independent status
72
habilitating such judgment as knowledge.1
169. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 290.
170. Gadamer "softened the original text" of Truth andMethod by adding the qualifier "often"
to underscore that it is distance, not just temporality, that allows the classical to critique the reader
in dialogue. Id. at 298 n.228.
171. Id. at 303.
172. ALTmRi, supra note 9, at 225-53; GADAMER, supra note 31, at 42-100. Gadamer argues
that Aristotle is an appropriate corrective to Kant's approach, inasmuch as Aristotle argues that
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Legal Classics and the Critique of the Legal Canon

The framework suggested by this reading of Gadamer and Altieri permits a reconceptualization of the challenges to the legal canon discussed
above. There are different canons under fire: the canon of legal scholarship,
the canon of curricular materials, and the canon of legal practice. Gadamer
and Altieri establish that these related canons are linked in a fundamental
way. Classical texts subtend each of the various canons, not just as constituitive parts but as defining examplars. Classical texts have cognitive
significance for participants in legal scholarship, teaching, or practice; such
texts embody historically defined standards of value. Legal classics cannot
be discarded at the instigation of contemporary commentators, for it is
through legal classics that commentators see the world. Challenges to the
legal canon are counterproductive to the extent they seek to silence legal
classics.
The fragmentation of legal scholarship poses a threat not because of
the proliferation of new ideas, but because it signals the possibility that
scholars will seek an insulating genre which abandons the public realm. 173
It is not a question of whether scholars invariably play their own
pre-scripted tune, but whether they respond by listening only to their own
melody, rather than by seeking to learn from others and attempting to join
an improvisational harmony-in-progress. 174 Scholarship written from diverse viewpoints has a positive value because it already exhibits the distance that can foster understanding, but surely this diversification will be
pointless if it promotes only hermetic solos. Although Professor Rubin's
attempt to articulate standards of effective scholarship is open to question,
his partial reliance on Gadamer leads him to identify important considerations for maintaining the public dramatic venue of legal scholarship. He
does not seek to enforce criteria of scholarly value as much as to foster a
scholarly practice that facilitates understanding. More importantly, Rubin
helps to provoke thinking about why some legal scholarship achieves class"ethics is logos also," and that phronesis is the ability to find the right nuance without the benefit
of precise dictates founded on a universal concept. Id. at 40 n.71, 312-24 ("The Hermeneutical
Relevance of Aristotle"). Jerome McGann incorrectly characterizes Gadamer as culminating
Kant's aesthetic theory. McGANr, LrrArtm o KNOW= E, supra note 49, at viii. It is more
accurate to read Gadamer as deconstructing what Kant has wrought by exposing the fault lines in
Kant's thinking.
173. See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text (discussing the work of Professors Culp,
Hutchinson, Rubin, Schlag, and Delgado).
174. Cf. Allan, supra note 10, at 5 ("The desires of the moment should alter the timbre or
tempo, and upon occasion the key, of the educational canon; but the theme, the melody and the
harmonic ideas, must be what is determinative. A crowd of musicians each tooting their own
homs is only noise.").
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ical status by concentrating on the effects that classical texts hold for
scholars.
Professor Ansley accurately identifies weaknesses in her attempt to
canonize the question of race within the curriculum, but her approach is
vindicated when canonical caricatures are avoided. 75 Ansley argues that
the Constitution is a classical document within the polity that, now more
than ever, speaks of the centrality of issues of race and provokes critical
self-reflection. It is pointless to try to canonize a particular interpretation of
the Constitution, but certainly it is essential to demonstrate the power of the
document-as interpreted in intervening history-to challenge us again to
confront the problems of political cohesion. Ansley's scholarly claims
should more closely parallel her teaching method of allowing the Constitution to speak and motivating others to listen to what has already prefigured
their apparently diverse outlooks. There is never a definitive exegesis, but
Gadamer and Altieri demonstrate that this lack of finality is productive
76
rather than destructive of public dialogue.'
Professor Sunstein's traditional defense of a capacious curricular canon as the core of a liberal education does not engage the critiques of the
canon. 17 7 It is all too easy to nod with approval when critics subject canonical texts to historicist interrogation but then to respond that historical contingencies do not preclude our critical assessment of the enduring worth of
canonical texts. Gadamer argues that the proper inquiry is "what happens
to us over and above our wanting and doing," challenging the self-assured
effort to master one's prejudices.'
The problem of the canon is not overcome by committing oneself to avoid bias, because it is the activity of commitment that is placed into question.
Finally, Professors Levinson and Balkin accurately identify the destructive effects that historicism holds for legal practice, but their analysis is
supplemented profitably by Gadamer's very similar, yet deeper, assessment. 1 79 Gadamer argues that the hyper-historical attitude of the modem
era cannot destroy our relation to tradition inasmuch as it too is predicated
on this inescapable relation. Although the authentic music movement might
signal the death of a formerly vibrant genre of music, Levinson and Balkin
recognize, almost in passing, that the historicist attitude cannot undermine
the entirety of musical tradition.
175. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 129-30, 160-61 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
178. GADANMR, supra note 31, at xxviii.
179. See supra notes 100-112 and accompanying text. Gadamer discusses historicism extensively in Truth and Method. See GADAMER, supra note 31, at 218-42 ('Tart II, ch. 1(2): Dilthey's
Entanglement in the Aporias of Historicism"); id. at 505-41 ("Supp. I: Hermeneutics and
Historicism").
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For most of us, this notion of living tradition is most obvious in
popular music. What makes Thelonious Monk's Round Midnight

a true "classic" of jazz is most certainly not its ability to be endlessly re-presented in a single canonical note-for-note form, but
rather its ability to
serve as the basic setting for creations by other
180
great musicians.
Gadamer makes precisely the same point as Levinson and Balkin about the
effect of historicizing a particular artwork, but he is more careful to reaffirm
the broader, unending movement of tradition.18 1 Gadamer too equates the

emergence of historical consciousness with a loss of innocence, but he is
adept at recovering the persistent performance that continues beneath the

choppy seas of critical historicism. 182 This is most pointedly revealed by
contrasting Levinson and Balkin's hesitant and careful comparison of the

performing arts of law and music with Gadamer's much broader claim that
understanding is a performative fusion of horizons, such that even viewing
a painting should be considered a performance. 8 3
The idea that classical texts demonstrate the historicity of knowledge
and reveal the process of understanding as a dramatic projection resulting in
a fusion of horizons will guide my analysis of legal classics. Before proceeding, it is prudent to recap this idea and reemphasize its complexity by
180. Levinson and Balkin, supra note 2, at 1623.
181. GADAMBR, supra note 31, at 496 ("A performance that was 'historically faithful' would
not be a genuine artistic performance-i.e., the work would not present itself to us... as a work
of art; rather, it would be-insofar as such a thing is possible-a didactic product or merely
material for historical research . . . ." (emphasis added)). Levinson and Balkin miss what
Gadamer takes to be fundamental: the authentic music movement can never reduce Beethoven to a
historical artifact because there always exists a performance, even under the stultifying conditions
established by the movement's adherents.
182. Gadamer describes the situation of modernity in terms strikingly similar to those later
adopted by Levinson and Balkin.
Since [the emergence of historical consciousness], the continuity of the Western philosophical tradition has been effective only in a fragmentary way. We have lost that naive
innocence with which traditional concepts were made to serve one's own thinking.
Since that time, the attitude of science towards these concepts has become strangely
detached, [obscuring] the hermeneutic experience.
Id. at xxiv.
183. Id. at 134-44 ("Part II, ch. II(2)(a): The Ontological Valence of the Picture"). Gadamer
asserts that this performance is disrupted by the advent of the modem museum. Id. at 87; cf.
DEwEY, supra note 119, at 8 (arguing that the relegation of classic artworks to a museum setting
removes them from the performance of reconciling the origins of the artwork and the viewer's
contemporary concerns, and thereby fosters a dead canon rather than an experiential encounter
with a classic). Dewey joins Gadamer in rejecting the false choice between idealism or empiricism as an account of understanding, id. at 130-31, and he emphasizes the crucial function of
performance when he succinctly states that a "work of art no matter how old and classic is actually, and not just potentially, a work of art only when it lives in some individualized experience,"
id. at 108.
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quoting from Gadamer's Afterword to the third German edition of Truth
and Method.
It was not defining some canon of content specific to the classic
that encouraged me to designate the classical as the basic category of effective history. Rather, I was trying to indicate what
distinguishes the work of art, and particularly the eminent text,
from other traditionary materials open to understanding and interpretation. The dialectic of question and answer that I elaborated
is not invalidated here but modified: The original question to
which a text must be understood as an answer has.. . an originary
superiority to and freedom from its origins. This hardly means
that the "classical work" is accessible only in a hopelessly conventional way or that it encourages a reassuringly harmonious
conception of the "universally human." Rather, something
"speaks" only when it speaks "originarily," that is, "as if it were
saying something to me in particular." This hardly means that
what speaks in this way is measured by a suprahistorical norm.
Just the reverse is true: what speaks in this way sets the standard.
And that is the problem. In such cases the original question that
the text is understood as answering claims an identity of meaning
which has always already
mediated the distance between its ori18 4
gin and the present.
With this understanding, Part V now examines what remains after the
deconstruction of the legal canon: the legal classic.

V. A CoMMoN-LAW CLASSIC
This Article first described the caricatural quality of much of the debate over the literary canon and revealed the initial tendencies of legal
scholarship to mimic this unhelpful approach. Then, the Article suggested a
productive framework of inquiry by combining themes from Altieri's literary criticism and Gadamer's philosophy. Against that background, this Part
argues that legal classics are an inevitable feature of legal scholarship, education, and practice. In particular, this Part contends that Hadley v. Baxendale 8 5 is a common-law classic. By describing Hadley as a legal classic,
the discussion shifts to a more concrete level, but this move should not be
regarded as simply applying a delineated general theory to a particular setting. Thinking about Hadley and its place within contemporary legal practice helps to frame the larger theoretical issues discussed above.
Most lawyers readily will recall that Hadley is the casebook stalwart
which established a foreseeability test as a default rule for determining
when consequential damages are available in an action for breach of con184. G AMEmR, supra note 31, at 577-78.
185. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
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tract. The plaintiffs in Hadley, owners of a grist mill, delivered a broken
crank shaft to the defendant common carrier and arranged for it to be transported to a manufacturer to serve as a model. 86 The mill owners sued on
account of the carrier's delay, claiming that they had lost profits due to the
extended down time at the mill. 8 7 The Exchequer Chamber held that the
jury's exercise of unfettered discretion in setting damages was improper,
remanded the case for a new trial, and stated that consequential damages for
lost profits were unavailable on the facts of the case. 188 In the course of its
opinion, the court formulated the general rule that the only compensable
losses in an action for breach of contract are those losses arising naturally
from the breach and those that might reasonably be supposed to have been
in the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.1 89 A great
deal of subsequent energy on the part of contracts teachers, judges, and
scholars has been expended to explain and assess the rule of Hadley.190
The case provides an excellent example of a legal classic because it is
widely known even though 140 years have passed since it was decided;
that, of course, is the point.
Describing Hadley as a classic seems unreal, since virtually all lawyers
would agree that Hadley is not read in the same way or for the same purposes that Virgil or Milton are read. It is highly unlikely that anyone settles
into an easy chair with a glass of sherry and a dusty volume of the English
Reports, eager to experience the sonorous timbre and melodic cadence of
the opinion one more time. The Hadley opinion, after all, simply communicates the decision of an empowered civil authority and it is almost certainly
always read with that context in mind. But Hadley is not so easily cabined
into such a functional mode. Hadley is plainly not a literary classic, but it
does serve the cognitive function of a legal classic. Hadley is a text, and as
a text it inevitably rises above the immediate communicative context of a
command and shares a fundamental identity with works of literature, de186. Id. at 146.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 151-52.
189. Id. at 152.
190. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101-04, 108-18 (1989); Richard Danzig, Hadley
v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STuD. 249 passim (1975);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principleof Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. Rnv. 563 passim (1992);
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: ConsequentialDamages in the Law of Contract, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 105 passim (1989); Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 passim (1990); Janet T. Landa, Hadley v.
Baxendale and the Expansion of the Middleman Economy, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 455 passim (1987);
Jeffrey M. Perloff, Breach of Contract and the ForeseeabilityDoctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale,
10 J. LEGAL STuD. 39 passim (1981); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a GeneralTheory
of Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 329, 366-76 (1991).
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spite the obvious and important differences between them. 9 ' This situation
is underscored by considering that Hadley is not binding law in this country. Instead, it has served as an influential text in the development of binding law.' 9 2 It is not so strange after all to characterize Hadley as a legal
classic.
The description of Hadley as a classic requires a brief recapitulation.
Texts invite performative readings. Understanding represents the fusion of
the horizon of a reader motivated by a fore-structure of interests and the
horizon formed by the history of effects of a text. A classic text both constitutes us and decenters us with constant questioning, and therefore regularly produces understanding. A classic legal text shapes the legal world of
the contemporary practitioner and also serves as a point of reference in the
constant negotiations concerning the future contours of the legal world.
Hadley's classical status is evidenced in a number of superficial ways.
First, treatise writers pay Hadley the respect owed a classical text. 193 Second, Hadley remains influential in legal practice, long after its publication
in 1854.194 Finally, law students uniformly must master the Hadley doctrine; even when casebook editors choose not to include Hadley in their
damages chapter, the contemporary decisions included in the book invaria195
bly describe and then venerate or critique the Hadley rule.
The idea of the classic developed in this Article extends beyond the
superficial achievement of prolonged and widespread popularity. Therefore, a more detailed explanation of why Hadley is a legal classic is neces191. See supra note 63. Joel Weinsheimer makes the point that every field has its classics

because classics have cognitive significance. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 1, at 140. The important
differences between aesthetic texts and legal texts do not override the similar cognitive function
that literary and legal classics perform.
192. Hadley thus stands as another example of the idea expressed supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
193. JOHN D. CA.MAIu & JOSEPH M. PaI.o, THE LAW OF CoNriRcrs § 14-5, at 593 (3d
ed. 1987) ("It has won universal acceptance in the common law world and remains the leading
case in the field."); ARmTm L. CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CoNTRrc-rs § 1007, at 7 (1964) ("leading
case"); E. ALLAN FARswoRTH, CoNTcrrs § 12.14, at 873 (1990) (a "fountainhead"); HOWARD
0. HUNTER, MODERN LAw OF CoNTRrcrs § 7.03[3][b], at 7-12 (1986) ("read by every first year
contracts student" and "cited in thousands of decisions"); WALTER H. E. JAEGER, WILISTON ON
CoNTRrcrs § 1356, at 289 (3d ed. 1968) ("leading case"); JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CoT
rs § 120, at 685 (3d ed. 1990) ("It has been... universally accepted by our courts
....

"); JAMES J. WITE AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMEaRCIAL CODE § 10-4, at

443-44 (3d ed. 1988) (knowledge of Hadley "has become a sine qua non to second-year standing
in law school").
194. See, e.g., Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 786 (2d Cir. 1992)
(describing Hadley as a "venerable holding" that "lives on" and whose nile is determinative of one
of the issues on appeal). Entering the search "Hadley w15 Baxendale" in the LEXIS Mega Library
on February 14, 1994 revealed 752 cases citing Hadley, including 18 United States Supreme Court
opinions.
195. See, e.g., MicHAEL L. CLosEN Er AL., CoNTRAcTs: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS,

AND PROBLEMS 461-77 (1992).
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sary. In his wonderful series of lectures on the demise of classical contract
law, Grant Gilmore suggests that this is an extremely problematic
96
question.'
Since 1854 the starting point for alf discussion of contract damage
theory has been Hadley v. Baxendale-althoughwhy such an essentially uninteresting case, decided in a not very good opinion by
a judge otherwise unknown to fame, should immediately have become celebrated on both sides of the Atlantic is one of the mysteries of legal history. 197
Although he does not take up this question in a systematic way, Gilmore's
description of Hadley's place in the evolving common law of contracts
sheds a great deal of light on the nature of the legal classic. Gilmore's
broad thesis is that the self-contained, formalist approach evidenced in
classical contract theory during the nineteenth century misrepresented the
state of the law and produced untold difficulties for the development of the
law, with many of these difficulties as yet unresolved. Gilmore discusses
Hadley as a prime example of a case that was narrowly read against its
grain to serve the ends of abstract theory-both by reading the case solely
as a negative limitation on damages and by the later short-lived attempt to
interpret Hadley as permitting consequential damages only upon a showing
98
that they were tacitly agreed upon by the parties.'
Gilmore argues that Hadley has survived these affronts and surmises
that this survival evidences a certain staying power. "Hadley v. Baxendale
is still, and presumably always will be, a fixed star in the jurisprudential
firmament."' 9 9 This staying power can be explained, he suggests, at least
partly by the general wording of the opinion.

196. The formal system of contract law espoused by Dean Langdell, Samuel Williston, and
others is commonly referred to as "classical contract law." In this usage, "classical" generally
connotes both "paradigmatic" and "antiquated," but in any event does not refer to the use of
"classical" outlined in this Article. For critical overviews of classical contract law, see P.S.
A'mr'AH, THE RisE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT passim (1979); GRANT GILMoRE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT passim (1974).
197. Gr.moRF_ supra note 196, at 49.
198. Gilmore argues that Hadley is read improperly as limiting damages, when in fact all other
specific rules for measuring damages in existence at the time were far more narrow. Id. at 51-53,
83. Professor Farnsworth properly describes this reading as "unorthodox," inasmuch as most
scholars contrast the general default rule of Hadley with what preceded it-unrestricted jury discretion-and conclude that it is a rule of limitation. FAMSWORTH, supra note 193, at 913 n.3.
Gilmore also references Holmes's unsuccessful effort to paint the "tacit agreement" gloss on Hadley, an approach that has been firmly rejected in Article Two of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§ 2-715 cmt. 2, and in the common law, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcrs § 351 cmt. a
(1979).
199. GILMORE, supra note 196, at 83.
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In the hundred odd years since the case was decided, the compendious formula of Hadley v. Baxendale has meant all things to all
men.
I observed in our earlier discussion of Hadley that the damage formula which Baron Alderson stated is, taken by itself, affirmative and that the limitations of foreseeability and
communication are easily manipulable. 2"
Gilmore recognizes that Hadley, a centerpiece of the classical system of
contract law, remains the focus even of decisions moving away from the
classical model, and, hence, it is a "fixed star."2 0 1 If Gilmore is correct in
asserting that the law may evidence an unending undulation between classicism (systemic and logical development) and romanticism (formless and
chaotic questioning), he falls to acknowledge the significant implication
that Hadley appears to be a timeless classic which modulates this alternating rhythm within a particular context.20 2 It is not surprising that critics
invariably suggest a new interpretation of the Hadley foreseeability rule
rather than suggesting that they are beginning anew as if Hadley had never
been decided.2 ' 3 Gilmore exposes Hadley as a legal classic, but he does not
explore what this means.
Asserting that Hadley is a legal classic means just this: It is inconceivable that a contemporary participant in legal practice could think about the
consequential damages available in the event of a breach of contract without thinking through the opinion, even if that person had never actually read
the opinion. Efforts to discredit the opinion will be reactive, for the opinion
does not stand as a historical fact so much as a historical force that cannot
be ignored. This is not to say that Hadley is a legal classic because it exhibits certain formal characteristics or espouses certain universal ideals that
transcend history. Such a traditional notion of the classical is rightly ridiculed. Hadley is a contingent historical occurrence that has survived on
account of specific historical developments, but it is Hadley's very embeddedness in history that generates its power as a classic. Contemporary practitioners also are embedded in history and do not have access to a timeless
critical view; as such, they are shaped by the history of effects that Hadley
200. Id. at 50, 83.
201. Id. at 83 (discussing Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd. [The Heron 1], 3 All E.R. 686 (H.L.
1967)).
202. GIMoRE, supra note 196, at 102-03; cf Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice
Paradox,35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 329, 347 (1993) (arguing that Gilmore's description of the
alternating rhythms of the law can be radicalized by employing chaos theory).
203. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supranote 190, at 598-604 (arguing that economic changes suggest
that the Hadley foreseeability requirement, increasingly read in the case law as requiring only
reasonable foreseeability, should be relaxed further to require only proximate cause, but also conceding that a foreseeability requirement, as opposed to strict absolute liability, is appropriate).
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has spawned in the form of countless decisions and commentary. 204 Put

concretely, it is difficult to talk about appropriate consequential damages
for breach of contract without justifying one's approach according to its
impact on someone standing in Mr. Hadley's shoes and without reference to
the points of consideration raised in the Hadley analysis.
The model of the legal classic drawn from the work of Professors Altied and Gadamer in this Article acknowledges historical contingencies not
as sources of error or conditions that can be placed before the critical seat of

reason, but instead as the unavoidable conditions of understanding that
frame the intersubjective dramatic arena which enables knowledge. In her
influential article, Contingencies of Value, Barbara Herrnstein Smith chronicles "the history of taste" as exhibited in literary evaluation, arguing that

"all value is radically contingent, being neither an inherent property of objects nor an arbitrary projection of subjects but, rather, the product of the
dynamics of an economic system."20 5 Smith acknowledges that the canoni-

cal literary work which survives its original historical context "begins increasingly not merely to survive within but to shape and create the culture
in which its value is produced and transmitted," but she finds this process
troubling because the text inevitably will "reinforce establishment ideolo204. Stanley Fish comes close to adopting this theme by emphasizing that postmodern attacks
on the traditional conception of canons will, in the end, have little effect on the actual operation of
canons within their socio-cultural contexts. Fish, supra note 15, at 18. Fish argues that
postmodernism's lesson will not cut deeply if the discourse to which it is directed is
constitutionally incapable of hearing it.
The (perhaps counterintuitive and certainly anticlimactic) conclusion is that none
of the answers one might give to the key question of the canon debate-where do canons come from?-would have any appreciable effect on canons, which will be just as
constraining (and/or vulnerable to challenge) as they were before we put the question.
Whether canons have their pedigree in divinity or in the labors of men and women like
you and me, they will continue to shape the background conditions within which we go
about our business, including the business of interrogating canons.
Id. at 19-20. It is plain, however, that Fish adopts a complex set of attitudes that are antithetical to
the themes developed in this Article: a preoccupation with the cognitive impairment rather than
enablement represented by classical texts; a thoroughgoing bifurcation of theory and practice; and
a resolute defense of the insularity of interpretive communities composed of what Pierre Schlag
adroitly has termed "relatively autonomous selves." See Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of
the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 G-o. L.J. 37, 39 (1987).
205. Smith, supra note 30, at 10-11. Smith, of course, is using the phrase "economic system"
in a very broad sense to refer to the reciprocal relationship of an individual's needs, the community's needs, and the resources of the text. Id. at 11-19 ('The Economics of Literary and Aesthetic
Value"). Martha Nussbaum recently noted that the convergence of left-wing literary theory and
right-wing economic theory in Smith's work-creating, in effect, an "all-American, Chicago-school, economic deconstructionism"-is not surprising, given the fact that both of the
seemingly opposed traditions are grounded in an attack on the rationality of normative commitment. Martha Nussbaum, Skepticism About PracticalReason in Literature and the Law, 107
HARV. L. Rnv. 714, 731 (1994). Nussbaum's Aristotelian antidote closely resembles my
Gadamerian critique of Smith in this Article.
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gies."2 0 Although her diagnosis is marred, Smith's description is accurate.
The classic text provides the venue for raising claims against "establishment ideologies" precisely because it holds the importance for the cultural
reproduction that Smith describes. The contingency of value should not
inspire a resolutely suspicious questioning of these contingencies so much
as an engagement with historically defined values.2 07
Richard Danzig's provocative commentary on Hadley is a useful example of misunderstanding the legal classic as a contingent historical fact
subject to a thoroughgoing critical appraisal. Danzig begins his interrogation by quoting Gilmore's description of Hadley as a "fixed star." He argues that it is important to uncover the historical bases of the decision in
assessing whether the case continues to be useful for resolving modem legal
problems.20° Danzig urges caution against accepting "fixed stars," and suggests that we continually should question the past to avoid being obeisant to
an outmoded rule."° In Holmesian fashion, Danzig concludes that Hadley
should be irrelevant to modem legal practice because it emerges from a
world of commerce strikingly different from the modem world. He voices
the fear that Hadley "retains its place [as a classic simply] because it seems
as though it has always held this place."'2 10 Danzig contends that Hadley is
a "fixed star" for contingent historical reasons having nothing to do with its
contemporary usefulness for adjudicating commercial disputes arising in an
advanced capitalist economy. 2 1'
Danzig's critical effort presumes that the historical distance between
the contemporary reader and the text is sufficient to permit the reader to
assess the text as something foreign.
The opinion in Hadley v. Baxendale is written in general terms
and has had a broad impact on the law of contracts for 120 years.
But at the time of its conception it was probably seen and shaped
by its authors in the context of uncertainties about the law of
agency and conflicts about the shape of the law of liability-particularly common carriers' liability-which are now generally
forgotten. 2
One immediately must ask: Is it necessary to have Professor Danzig tell us
that the world has changed since 1854? If Hadley truly were locked within
206. Id. at 28-29, 30.
207. Gadamer's differences with Smith are revealed in his very different rehabilitation of the
concept of taste as a mode of knowing. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 35-42; see also supra note
168.
208. Danzig, supra note 190, at 249-51.
209. Id. at 284.
210. Id. at 283; cf.supra note 107 and accompanying text (presenting Levinson and Balkin's
characterization of Holmes as the quintessential modernist).
211. Danzig, supra note 190, at 277-84.
212. Id. at 267.
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the historical circumstances of nascent capitalist development in the
mid-nineteenth century, then there would be no need to reveal this because
Hadley would now be long forgotten, along with the particular circumstances to which it responded. As Danzig readily notes, Hadley continues
to exert a broad impact long after its publication precisely because we read
it in "general" terms, which is to say that it speaks to the contemporary
reader rather than appearing to have only a specific, historical meaning.
His excellent historical survey of the specific circumstances surrounding the Hadley decision leads Danzig to ask the right question, which is
phrased in a manner remarkably similar to the question posed by Professor
Gilmore.
How does an opinion whose primary functions seem to correlate
with a quarrel over an 1830 transport act and with the needs of a
judicial system in the 1850's come to be viewed as "a fixed star in
the jurisprudential firmament" 120 years
later?... Why did this
2 13
case escape overruling and anonymity?
Danzig argues that the Hadley opinion, like any new invention, was advanced by the marketing techniques employed by the central players in its
creation. "If the common law is thought to be some 'brooding omnipresence' working itself pure, it obviously acquired some substantial human
assistance in this instance." 214 In a footnote, however, he acknowledges
that the case certainly is not "famous solely" because of such factors, and he
notes that it must also have had "functional significance for the other
judges" of that time.2 15 Although Danzig obliquely raises the question of
the legal classic as defined in this Article, in the end he concludes that the
staying power of the case represents an irrational traditionalism that should
be corrected on the basis of a critical assessment.
Danzig's article is well written and thoroughly researched, and I consistently am repaid when I read it. The value of the article, though, emerges
in spite of its express thesis. The continuing centrality of Hadley gives the
lie to Danzig's thesis that Hadley is an obsolete invention. Danzig's careful
historical inquiry reinforces the classical status of the Hadley opinion inasmuch as he supplements the historical force that Hadley exhibits. By deciding to research and write about Hadley, Danzig reinforced its centrality to
legal practice even as he advocated for its decreased importance in the modem economy. The classic is not defined so much by universal acclaim as it
is by its influence in shaping hotly contested debates. For example, Hadley
recently has assumed new life in the debates among law and economics
213. Id. at 274.
214. Id. at 276.
215. Id. at 276 n.117.
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scholars over the functional efficiency of a foreseeability default rule.2 16 It
would be an obvious mistake to think that Hadley survives on account of
immutable formal qualities that permit infinite commentary. Danzig and
Gilmore both describe Hadley as a generally worded opinion, but Hadley
appears this way to contemporary readers only because the pointed factual
statement and concise rationale for the decision still sound as if the words
were written yesterday. There undoubtedly are many judicial opinions from
nineteenth-century England with brief, generally phrased opinions that now
are forgotten entirely and would be read as historical artifacts, notwithstanding the abstract generality of their language. Hadley is a legal classic
because it still serves to clarify the range of legitimate discourse in the
continuing development of the common law of contracts.
It is crucial to recall the intersubjective qualities of the classical text
that Altieri captures with his description of the dramatic, idealizing performance of reading literature. Hadley stands as the progenitive force behind a public discourse and continues as the focal point for a shared effort
to define social identity. Although Hadley ostensibly operates only within
the narrow context of the law of contracts, it is no longer revolutionary to
suggest that this particularized public dialogue about legal relations implicates the broader public dialogue about the social world that often is addressed in literature. One might suppose that the adversarial roles assumed
by lawyers indicates that legal practice is a wholly instrumental'activity;
however, under the analysis of the legal classic in this Article, it is more
accurate to view these performances as projections of a certain image of the
shared law. One would hardly fault an actor for taking different approaches
to playing the same character in response to changing political, economic,
and social circumstances. Hadley continues to provide a perch from which
performing lawyers similarly can modify their performances in response to
the changing circumstances of their clients. Lawyering is never truly the
instrumental behavior of a monadic individual because a lawyer's performance always is shaped in advance by the public realm represented by the
historical force of legal classics like Hadley. In other words, Hadley continues to provide the lines that lawyers use in their performances, and these
lines are shared and publicly redeemed rather than individually crafted.
The emerging canon debate in the legal academy, if caricatural in
form, would subject Hadley to a critical appraisal that would permit only
two attitudes: for or against. Hadley would be presented as sublime or
sexist, inspiring or oppressive, rich or racist. But once we understand that
the legal classic transcends the narrow categorization that is suggested by
216. See, e.g., supra note 190 (citing sources that discuss the efficiency of a foreseeability
default rule).
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the ideal of a canon, it is possible to approach Hadley with greater subtlety.
The classical text exerts its force in a manner that precedes and in part
defines the critical stances adopted within the canon debate. The classical
text demonstrates that the self-assured critical knowledge of the theorist is
always already a manifestation of a wider tradition. Hadley is a common-law classic. Theorists should never canonize the opinion as beyond
reproach or questioning because this attitude runs contrary to the classic
experienced as a challenge or question. Nor should theorists ever assume
that a classic can be subverted, as if from outside its grasp. The classic calls
for constant questioning and engagement-if we do not turn a deaf earbut it also partially shapes the field in which the questioning shall occur.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Defenders of the canon can score some telling points in the impending
debate over the legal canon. Perhaps the most important will be to demonstrate that challenging the canon itself is canonized in the Western tradition
of rationalism, and that substantively many contemporary challenges to the
canon are historically rooted in the very traditions under attack. Defenders
will argue that it is unrealistic to paint the Western tradition as a uniform
voice of conformity when, in fact, it is a cacophony of competing visions of
beauty and truth that continually invite critical engagement. Telling as they
are, these points will not carry the day, nor should they. The hegemonic
power of canonization is a stifling institutional force that we now concede
has subjugated large segments of the community. Deconstructing the legal
canon will provide some measure of liberation if it ushers in a commitment
to achieving that ever-elusive, quasi-oxymoronic goal: a pluralistic
community.
Nevertheless, deconstructing the legal canon is not a self-sustaining
critical project that can approach the law from the outside. Deconstruction
is only part of the story, even if an important part. As Professor Altieri
argues with regard to literary criticism, this
is not to say that literary criticism should avoid demystifying texts
or revealing the delusions of certain reverential stances. It is to
suggest, however, that such demystifications are neither sufficient
goals for criticism as a whole nor adequate measures of the forms
of power and identity that literary studies can make available.
For once we get the hang of the method of demystification, there
is little point to yet one more demonstration.21 7
217. ALnmn,

supra note 9, at 6, 8.
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The more difficult and engaging topic is the persistent power of the legal
classic, which subtends critical stances rather than submitting to them. No
legal classic is timeless in the sense that it is destined to last forever, nor
can we ever say with assurance which texts hold this power within a pluralistic, dynamic society. But we can recognize the existence and significance
of legal classics. This recognition is a vital supplement to the canon debate.
In the critical atmosphere of contemporary scholarship, the battle lines
commonly are drawn with sharp resolution: Milton is a raving misogynist
or a protofeminist; Hadley represents outmoded economics or an efficient
default rule.2 1 What persists unseen is the power of Milton and Hadley to
help us define patriarchy and economic efficiency, not simply by providing
an example but by helping to shape in advance the demarcation of these
topics. Milton suffers the scathing inquiries of feminists and Hadley suffers
the narrow focus of sophisticated economic analysis, which is to say that
Milton and Hadley become venues at this point in history for defining these
inquiries.
The power of the classic lies in its cognitive significance: it shapes the
world in which it appears as a provocation, and its continual reappropriation
within a society spells the continuity of the ever-changing force of tradition.
Thinking about legal classics, then, leads to thinking about issues of fundamental philosophical importance. What does it mean for a finite being to
learn and understand? What defines the social setting that serves as the
arena of understanding? Like any tradition, the legal tradition affords no
easy analysis with respect to these questions, although thinking about legal
classics is certainly a step in the proper direction.
Recognizing the power of the legal classic shapes my practice as a law
professor. It would be a mistake to read this Article as an invitation to
fatalistic quietism. Legal classics do not predetermine the legal world by
means of a mysterious power that is immune to the questions and concerns
of the present. I hope that my analysis makes clear my challenge to such a
static conception. The legal classic persistently demands an active reader,
which is why neither I nor my students can ever say enough in class about
the legal classics included in my teaching materials. I strive to accept the
questioning challenge of the legal classic while also keeping in check the
natural tendency to adopt a critical historicist attitude of superiority that
muffles the dialogue with the classic. Reading through legal classics rather
than wholly against them is a better practical strategy for critically engaging the legal tradition and reaching understanding, for it is then that I
218. Stanley Fish, who earned his fame as a Milton scholar, agrees that debunking the unitary
canon in favor of pluralistic canons does not necessarily spell doom for the acknowledged classics. Fish cites the dispute even among feminists over Milton's significance for feminist criticism.
Fish, supra note 29, at 14-15.
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(meaning my prejudiced fore-structure) am most at risk within an intersubjective encounter. The cash value of my discussion of the legal classic is
earned not in the theoretical discourse of this Article, but in the day-to-day
practice that my theoretical discussion is intended to facilitate.
I anticipate that many readers will find that this Article raises many
more questions than it has answered in its interdisciplinary discussion of the
classic. In my defense, I remind the reader that my goal from the start was
rather circumspect: to outline the grammar of a productive framework
within which the promise of the canon debate can be realized. Even within
this framework the questioning and debating will be ceaseless, but it will be
questioning and debating that is productive, rather than polemical. Because
it is impossible to formulate a definitive statement about the legal classic, I
will close by borrowing, as I have done on many occasions in the past, the
wise words of Professor Gadamer.
But I will stop here. The ongoing dialogue permits no final conclusion. It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could
have, or had to have, the last word. 2 19

219. GADAmER, supra note 31, at 579; see also WEINSHEiMMR, supra note 1, at xii:
I do not pretend that philosophical hermeneutics can resolve [the current debate concerning the canon]. Quite the opposite, its effect may well be to prolong it, for the value
of philosophical hermeneutics in the context of the classic lies not so much in providing
answers as in opening up questions that have not been fully considered.

